Compare And Contrast Xúnzǐ's Form Of State Perfectionism With Mill's View Of Liberty

Mill defends liberty as a means of achieving the highest utility in a society. What he means by utility, however, is 'utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being' (Mill, 1859, p. 224). A crucial assumption for Mill is that humans are capable of progress, and therefore maximum happiness is achieved through improvement. It may be the case that the state can dictate the way of life which results in a higher 'utility' than is the case under individual freedom (although Mill by no means concedes this), but this meaning of 'utility' would then not be the sense relevant to Mill's argument.

His first argument for freedom to choose one's own way of living is that individuals are more likely than society to be right about the best life for themselves. Since the individual is more immediately concerned with his life than the state, Mill argues that the individual is more likely to be correct about what makes them happy. This is a plausible hypothesis, although in principle it is possible that the individual may well be wrong about his desires (Taylor, 1979), for example in cases of addiction. Nevertheless, it would be natural to claim that, on the whole, the individual is the best, if not infallible, judge of himself.

Mill's second argument reassures those who might be worried about the fallibility of the individual's judgement - the very exercise of choice is important for the development of his human faculties. Thus, even if it were the case that the state is right and the individual is wrong, a life that the individual has not chosen for himself but has been forced upon him is devoid of a significant part of its value.

Mill's third and most important argument is that if individuals were free to live how they like, their lifestyles would serve to be 'experiments in living' to demonstrate their values to both their contemporaries and future generations. It should be clear that this argument relies heavily on the assumption that humans are capable of learning from experience. 'The only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty' (Mill, 1859, p. 272) - liberty is valuable in so far as it allows for improvement, which is the only way to achieve 'utility in the largest sense'. If the reality is that mankind is not progressive, then these 'experiments' are worthless. If 'utility in the largest sense' is not possible, then the 'utility' derived from state guidance may be a worthwhile aim after all.

Xúnzǐ position is based