Hussein's Speech Of 1980

Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi-Iranian War

Saddam Hussein's address to the nation on September 28, 1980 about the conflict with Iran was a means of reaffirming the anti-Iranian ideology of his speech on the 17th and elaborating on it in a new context just six days after Iraq invaded Iran. Hussein's oration helps to exhibit the heavily involved task of justifying and gaining support for the war with Iran in Iraq, despite his role as a dictator, and in the surrounding region. The manipulations of the Iranian situation and the Iraqi cause in his speech affirm the fact that he was aware of Iraq's diversity and consciously used that knowledge in forming his appeal to the population. He established an unmistakable focus on nationalism and Pan-Arabism to aid his efforts, while wisely avoiding attacks on Islamic expansion in his speech so as not to lay the groundwork for dissent. Hussein stressed the principles of this focus by skillfully boosting his regime's image while belittling the Iranian leadership. In doing so, Hussein's speech also served to rebut the anti-Ba'th rhetoric coming from Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini.

Hussein's address was an attempt on his part to justify Iraq's invasion of Iran. He recounts Iraq's abrogation of the Algiers Accord on the 17th, a decision that was based on Iran's violation of the agreement by allowing Kurdish refugees to pass across its border.

This act removed Iraq from under the umbrella of its stipulations regarding the borders between the two countries. According to his account, conflict arose when Iraq "peacefully" attempted to extend its rightful sovereignty to Shatt al-Arab, a territory that had once been under its control but was ceded to Iran under the accord. Hussein claimed that Iran unjustifiably attacked Iraqi targets in response to their efforts, and that this meant "the cutting off of the vital vein of Iraq's economy." He added, "Iraq could never remain silent in the face of the repeated aggression of the Iranian authorities, which are completely devoid of any sense of responsibility. The Iranian authorities are thirsty for destruction, sabotage and the shedding of blood. They are not interested in their country's security, the fate of their peoples, the security and stability of the region or the world's legitimate interests." The invasion was Iraq's reaction to the alleged "repeated aggression." There does not seem to be any legitimacy to his justification, although it does outline the prominence of his personal agenda: Arab expansionism. Historical fact and even his own wording assert the fact that his actions were undoubtedly geared towards regaining control of the Shatt al-Arab and other key areas to improve Iraq's position in the region.

Ayatollah Khomeini, the Shi'a leader of Iran, believed in Islamic expansionism and was actively outspoken against Hussein's regime. In light of the suppression of Shi'a disturbances before the war, he claimed that Hussein and his Ba'th party were "attacking Islam and the Quran." He also called upon the Iraqi people and army to renounce the Ba'th regime and remove it from power. Khomeini's rhetoric posed a problem for the Iraqi leadership because of the Shi'a majority in Iraq's population. Hussein's manner of countering the potential threat implies that he was aware of certain limitations on his ability to attack the Iranian government and its rhetoric, given the chance that the Shi'a population could put aside political differences and jointly choose religion over nationalism. As opposed to attacking Khomeini's proclaimed program of Islamic expansion, he chose to belittle his regime's religious integrity. He described the government as a "pagan, oppressive and conceited clique of heretics," that had a "wicked will." He drew from the Koran in one of his arguments as he added, "Almighty God has said: But if the enemy is inclined towards peace, do thou also incline towards peaceÐ'... The oppressive clique ruling in Tehran is not inclined toward peace." By incorporating this passage from the Koran, Hussein was probably able to diminish the credibility of Iran's new government in the eyes of Iraq's Shi'a population.

It should not be assumed that Hussein promoted Islamic law as he appears to have done in using the passage from the Koran when read out of context. With Shi'a loyalties in question, Islam was a necessary means through which he could establish a nationalist and Pan-Arab devotion to support his actions. He glorified the invasion and promoted Iraq with a combination of the differing ideologies of Islam and nationalism/pan-Arabism. He said that the conflict was necessary "to defend Iraq's honor, sovereignty and vital interest," and that "We had to unsheathe the Iraq sword and the Arab sword." He goes on to say that it had to be done "in order to strike this tyrannical clique and teach it a new historical lesson like that of the glorious Al-Qadisiyah battle which destroyed Khosraw's arrogance, raised the banners of Islam and eliminated infidelity, ignorance and aggression in the region. This was also done by our brave army in Zaya al-Qaws and Sayf Sa'd." Hussein, on the surface, embraced a greater Arab heritage, and as such he showed no reservations in using Islam, an integral part of the heritage, regardless of his secular beliefs. This excerpt wholly embodied Ba'th principles. The "Iraq sword and the Arab sword" represent nationalism and pan-Arabism, and it was the historical reference to the war in the name of Islam that acted as a medium for the principles to reach the whole of Iraq. Arrogance, infidelity, ignorance, and aggression are all qualities that Hussein charged Iran as harboring. He furthered this outreach later in his speech by connecting the past with the present as he said, "The bright history of the Arab nation and the glorious history of Iraq are represented in our army's life and battles." Pan-Arabism becomes prominent as the foundation for his case against Iran with his detailing of a link between Iraq's plight and the surrounding Arab states.

In the opening of his address, Hussein offered "Greetings of the national and pan-Arab struggle." With the entire region as his audience, he believed some sense of justification was attainable if he could prove that it was truly a pan-Arab struggle, although it would not be a factually based rationalization. He knowingly used fear in his efforts when he put to use the popular anti-imperialist sentiment in the region. The notions of independence and full sovereignty were embedded in the region's