Kiergegaard 's Faith

In Fear and Trembling, under the pseudonym of Johannes de Silentio, Soren Kierkegaard explains the concept of faith. Kierkegaard believes that far too often we use faith as a starting point when in fact it is the greatest movement one can make. Essentially, we cannot have faith without going through various prerequisite movements and that, "faith begins precisely where thinking leaves off." This proposition establishes faith as a purely subjective matter that cannot be reasoned to.

Kierkegaard examines `the greatest movement one can make' by considering the story of Abraham and Isaac. He is perplexed at how Abraham could `raise the knife' on his own son; that he was willing to sacrifice Isaac [because of his faith in God], and at the same time had faith God would not require him see this act to fruition.

All along he had faith, he believed that God would not demand Isaac of him, while still he was willing to offer him if that was indeed what was demanded. He believed on the strength of the absurd, for there could be no question of human calculation, and it was indeed absurd that God who demanded this of him should in the next instant withdraw the demand. (Faith and Trembling 64)

It is clear that faith brings many complexities to the story of Abraham, so Kierkegaard investigates how one comes to have the faith that Abraham exhibited.

One does not begin with faith but in fact comes to faith through infinite resignation. This is where the idea of the Knight of Infinite Resignation comes in. To clearly portray the movements of this knight a new analogy is introduced involving a young lad who is in love with a princess. "The content of his whole life lies in this love, and yet the relationship is one that cannot possibly be brought to fruition, be translated from ideality into reality"(71). The young lad does not renounce his love for the princess; he renounces it as a finite possibility. This love is the `content of his whole life's reality' and cannot be realized in a finite sense. His love is only possible in a spiritual sense. "Everything is possible spiritually speaking, but in the finite world there is much that is not possible. This impossibility the knight nevertheless makes possible by his expressing it spiritually, but he expresses it spiritually by renouncing it"(73). By renouncing, the lad steps out of finitude and enters into the eternal consciousness (infiniteness). Once he makes the movement, he is reconciled with existence in his pain. It's only when the lad steps out of finitude into the infinite, that in his pain [as result of his self-alienation from finitude] he is reconciled with existence; it is precisely because he steps out of the boundaries of his existence that he realizes his existence is a part of finitude. If he cannot find a way back to finitude he will eternally experience incompatibility with finitude; metaphorically, he will appear to all of finitude to be a fish out of water. This is where the Knight of Faith enters.

The Knight of Faith is greater than the Knight of Infinite Resignation because he has made the step back to finitude. There is not the slightest crack in his finitude to let the light of the infinite shine through (68). He has made the double movement [from finitude to infinitude back to finitude] so perfectly, there is no sign of his greatness; he looks like a `tax gatherer', a `commoner' (68). He has made this second movement "on the strength of the absurd" (70), and now takes so much pleasure in the finite because he now exists with God's love.

The moment the knight resigned he was convinced of the impossibility, humanly speaking; that was a conclusion of the understanding, and he had energy enough to think it. In an infinite sense, however, it was possible, through renouncing it [as a finite possibility]; but then accepting that [possibility] is at the same time to have given it up, yet for the understanding there is no absurdity in possessing it, for it is only in the finite world that understanding rules and there it was and remains an impossibility. On this the knight of faith is just as clear: all that can save him is the absurd; and this he grasps by faith. Accordingly he admits the impossibility and at the same time believes the absurd...(75-6)

The analogy of the young lad and the princess can be applied to the above passage. The young lad resigns his love for the princess. This love is the content of his life, the young lad let's this love, "...twine itself in countless coils around every ligament of his consciousness..."(pg.71). He is this love, and is now convinced of the impossibility of his love for the princess being realized (in a finite sense). However, considered in an infinite sense, it is possible for his love to be realized by renouncing his love, and the following explains why this is. To accept the possibility that his love is possible (in an infinite sense) is at the same time to give up his love (in a finite sense). For the finite, to accept the possibility of an impossibility is absurd, yet for God (who is infinite) there is no absurdity in possessing this love. It is only in the finite world that the young lad's love remains an impossibility, and due to his resignation (making the first movement), the lad is now in the domain of the infinite. It is on the strength of this absurdity [(to possess his love is at the same time to have given it up) and (absurd to us but not to God)] that the lad is now in an absolute relationship with the absolute. Essentially, the lad has faith that for God nothing is absurd; for God, there is no absurdity in possessing something that at the same time has been given up. All that can save the young lad is the absurd, and he grasps this by faith. Thus, it is only because of his faith in the `strength of the absurd' that the lad can enter back into finitude completely (get the princess back in a finite sense). Without faith the lad cannot fully leave the infinite behind; without God becoming part of himself (absolute relationship with the absolute), the lad cannot resume his role in finitude.

The `teleological suspension of the ethical' (83) is the individual's suspension of the universal/ethical as its telos [end] in favor of something higher (God's law). This requires an explanation. There is: the individual; the particular; the universal; and now god's law, in Kierkegaard's adaptation of Hegel's `System'. In most cases, the individual is a particular instance of the universal/ethical and all the individual's actions have their