C2ips

Subject: Technology Memo Topic Paper P2: The Air Mobility Command's C2IPS integration

Date: 8 July 2007

In 2000, US Air Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC) had an idea for seamless information flow to the warfighter. This system would integrate much of the everyday planning, command and control, and mission execution into one source. AMC tried to develop Command and Control Information Processing System (C2IPS); a one-stop-shop for mission planners, aircrews, and mission commanders. Novel in its concept, the system was ill fated from the start.

It would replace the antiquated process of order generation, Form 59 mission itineraries, and aircrew paperwork all of which came from various sources into one large server. The problems stem from a myriad of issues: unreliable servers and slow networks, insufficient training for the end user, and inadequate support from senior leadership in its implementation; thusly, C2IPS was a failure.

C2IPS and its servers. The C2IPS system was massive in size and breadth, and required massive server space. It was going to be AMC's primary mission details platform, and would need powerful servers to accommodate the huge sums of users authorized access, and the server space to maintain the enormous amounts of data they produced--the construct of C2IPS was more than a planning tool. Mission planners would build missions based on need. In addition to size, network speed became an issue. Its size prevented timely access to data. Adding to the problem, the servers were not centralized to one location. Data transfer across multiple nodes depended on the level of network infrastructure from the users home station. Users in different commands were unable to share data. This left AMC as the sole proprietor and with no means of disseminating the information other than using the older Global Decision Support System (GDSS), a system C2IPS was suppose to replace. Therefore, users outside of AMC were relegated to the older GDSS.

The end user. Many of the users of the C2IPS complained about the intricacies of the system. It was too difficult to logon, its size made it operate slowly on the network, and its many parts/capabilities went under utilized. The program was confusing, and the training was inadequate to answer all the questions. A "crash course" was developed months before the system was to go into service, but because C2IPS was still under development, the training failed to keep up with the changes. Users taught themselves via trail and error. This learning through experience caused delays for mission planners, aircrew members, and schedulers.

The senior leadership and C2IPS. The system was setup for wing-level and Major Command level leadership to have a snapshot of the battle space--what each tanker, strategic and tactical airlift asset was doing. The problems with server integration were making this impossible. Wing leadership across AMC reverted back to GDSS for station workload messages and Form 59 reports invariably, citing a serious problem with C2IPS. The Deputy Director of Operations for AMC (AMC/DO) relaxed much of the restrictions on C2IPS allowing wing commanders to decide which system was best suited to their wing's needs. Many wing commanders delegated the authority down to the group and squadron commanders to decide. Since GDSS was still running in parallel to C2IPS, and because most of the users were better