Cold War

Ashley Wigfield

Mr. Fox

HS 132 J

10/04/05

Position Paper: The Inevitable Cold War

Following World War II, the actions and prevailing beliefs of both American and Russian leaders fueled distrust and resentment between the two powerful nations which eventually led to an unavoidable confrontation. Although the American mindset would have all blame placed on Russia, it is important to examine both sides of the issue in order to prove that both nations were merely acting for their own self-interests. As Truman's Secretary of Commerce, Henry A. Wallace said, "Whether we like it or not, the Russians will try to socialize their sphere of influence just as we try to democratize our sphere of influence." (Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, 33) Both nations believed that they had a right to expand their own unique brand of government to other places on the globe.

When Russia, America and Great Britain came together during World War II against the Axis powers, it was obvious that each nation had underlying motives during talks of post-war aims. Stalin insisted on "a more westerly frontier (incorporation of the Baltic nations and the Curzon Line in Poland) and a friendly postwar government" (Graebner, The Cold War, 3). This would create a secure western border as well as a buffer against Germany in the case of future aggression. At the Teheran Conference, Russia was vague about its requirement in order for it to lend aid to the US against Japan. Stalin did acknowledge his support for "Roosevelt's suggestion of a Pacific warm-water port under national control" (Gaddis, 78).

Later at the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt agreed to Stalin's demand of the Far East areas of "the Kurile Islands and lower Sakhalin, leases at Port Arthur and Dairen, control of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railroads, and recognition of the independence from China of Outer Mongolia" (Gaddis, 78). The US had a lot to lose in the war against Japan and wanted the Open Door policy in China to be secured. Russia's cooperation would be a huge factor in America's success to protect their capitalist interest. Roosevelt, without bothering to consult "his civilian advisors regarding the political consequences of this strategy" (Gaddis, 79), quickly agreed to Russia's demands and brought them before Chiang Kai-shek to approve. After that, Russia agreed to declare war against Japan as well as form "a pact of friendship and alliance" (Gaddis 78) with Kai-shek's Nationalist china.

Throughout WW II, Russia bore the brunt of the Axis' aggression. Russia was doing the largest amount of fighting and therefore lost the most lives and resources. In fact, "casualty figures reflect with particular vividness the disproportionate amount of fighting which went on in the east. A conservative estimate places Soviet war deaths - civilian and military - at approximately 16 million. Total Anglo-American losses in all theatres came to less than a million" (Gaddis 80). Russia recognized that capitalist America hesitated to form a second front in order to conserve its own citizens and resources. The "ideological differences" (Gaddis 80) of Communist Russia and Capitalist Democratic America predicted that distrust would eventually form between the allies. However, Roosevelt waiting two years before delivering on his promise of a second front did nothing but stir up the tensions already brewing between the nations.

During the war, the US had hesitated before offering aid to the Russians in the form of armaments. Through programs such as cash and carry and later, lend-lease, the US slowly moved away from isolationistic neutrality and warily entered into the alliance with Russia. The US gave the USSR "more than 17,000,000 tons of supplies valued at over $10 billion" (Herring XIII). This impressive donation by the US was celebrated by both sides and lend-lease was looked upon as a symbol of a trusting alliance between the US and the USSR. After the war, Russia, the nation that had once been a top world power was in desperate need of aid and trusted that the lend-lease program would continue following the end of the war. Henry A. Wallace encouraged America's continued help to Russia following the war. However by 1946, Truman had already put his policy to contain communism into effect and, through urging from his secretary of state, James Byrnes, and other members of his administration, had grown cold to Russia's request for aid. A letter by special counsel Clark Clifford stated to the president in clear terms why the US could no longer give any help to its former ally.

The memorandum set forth in a clear, comprehensive manner that had already gained wide acceptance in the administration. It argued that the Soviet leaders, driven on by a "haunting sense of insecurity" and by an ideology that promised the "ultimate destruction of capitalist states", had committed themselves . . . to expansionism. Despairing of cooperation with the USSR, the study proposed that the United States must "seek to prevent additional aggression," must "resist . . . any efforts of the USSR to expand into areas vital to American security," and must be prepared to "join with . . . Western countries in an attempt to build a world of our own which will pursue its own objectives . . . (Herring 269).

After America's sudden abolishment of lend-lease, Russia's spokesmen began to downplay the importance of the lend-lease program in the first place and even went far enough to suggest that America's contribution to the war effort was vastly overrated. America fired back that the United States had in fact provided the majority of war supplies and been the main reason why Russia had survived the Nazi invasion. This back-and-forth squabbling over the US and USSR's separate roles in WWII led to a fast-growing rivalry.

Even if all of the disagreements during and following WWII had never happened, a conflict between Russia and the US seemed inevitable ever since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution when the Czar Nicholas