Conficting Concerns

Bertrand Russell, the author of The Problems of Philosophy, and Rene Descartes, an immensely influential French philosopher, scientist, mathematician, and author of Meditations on First Philosophy, have conflicting views concerning the nature of matter. Russell contends that the true nature of matter, a constituent of the universe which consists of mass and occupies "real" space, if matter of course exists, must be inferred from what Russell calls "sense-data," what one perceives to be the immediate physical characteristics of an object of matter (Russell, 7-31). However, Descartes argues that the existence of this supposed matter is not derived from what we directly perceive as a result of our senses but is rather acquired unequivocally through the "intellect;" from his experience, material bodies are tricky in that they are able to morph from one supposed literal substance to another (Descartes, 19-23). Hence, although Russell and Descartes are bound together by alike discussion upon the same matter, they differ in their reasoning where Russell argues that the true nature of matter, assuming it exists, must be inferred by "sense-data" and Descartes argues that the nature of matter arises from "purely mental scrutiny" (Descartes, 21).

Both philosophers take on different approaches in an effort to prove their point. In an attempt to validate his argument, Descartes constructs a simple experiment where he melts beeswax over a flame. As he does this, he takes note of the features of the wax before it is put against the flame and after such has been committed. Before the wax is "by the fire," Descartes describes it as having "the taste of honey" and is "hard, cold and can be handled without difficulty." But, once the beeswax has been under the scorching heat of the blaze, "the residual taste is eliminated, the smell goes away, the colour changes, the shape is lost, the size increases; (and) you can hardly touch it" (Descartes, 20). Through such a procedure, Descartes shows us "extension," the process by which the scope, size, and/or range of a particular object is increased or prolonged, of what we would consider to be ordinary, but is it as ordinary as it seems? Because we bear witness of the transition of the wax from a solid object to a runny liquid, how is it that we know that the melted beeswax is in fact the same beeswax we began with? Descartes' answer is this: "But what is this wax which is perceived by the mind alone? . . . here is the point, the perception I have of it is a case not of vision or touch or imagination Ð'- nor has it ever been, despite previous experiences Ð'- but of purely mental scrutiny" (Descartes, 21). From this we can see that Descartes believes that the senses cannot be trusted to make out conclusions but are rather used to "judge" what particular objects may be (Descartes, 21). Russell's argument is quite different than that of Descartes' in that he asserts that the senses may very well deceive one, but may however, lead one to discover the true nature of matter, if it exists (Russell, 7-31). Though, Russell didn't go through any experimentation to present his contention as Descartes did, his ideas are just as valid. Russell simply observed the world around him and took note of exactly what he saw. What he saw were objects without any real color, any real shape, any real texture, any real measurements, nor any real mass. This may seem odd: This is because what he exactly saw wasn't exactly what the objects alleged to be. Russell's book, The Problems of Philosophy, starts out with the example of a table. Russell's technique is similar to that of Descartes' in that before he puts the table under criticism (where Descartes' example was beeswax under a literal flame), he takes note of its characteristics: "oblong, brown and shiny, to the touch it is smooth and cool and hard." Then he critiques the table in taking note of what it is he is actually seeing from where he is at a certain time: "Although I believe that the table is Ð''really' of the same colour all over, the parts that reflect the light look much brighter than the other parts, and some parts look white because of reflected light" (Russell, 8). Soon after Russell goes on to conclude "that there is no colour which preeminently appears to be the colour of the table" (Russell, 9). But what does all this mean? Russell commits to such in order to differentiate between "appearance," what we immediately and directly see and feel, and "reality," what the object actually is, assuming of course it is actually there (Russell, 12-16). Because of the disparity between "appearance" and "reality," as a result, two questions emerge: "(1) Is there any such thing as matter? (2) If so, what is its nature" (Russell, 12)? To answer the first question, Russell argues that we must look towards our "sense-data" for a plausible response because we cannot describe matter any further than what our "sense-data" allows for us to other than we feel "sensations," a superficial orgasm of the senses. Thus, you can now see the difference in theory of the nature and existence of matter made out by our two spotlight philosophers and the different approaches they took to advance their assertions. But, what exactly would they have to say about each others' views?

If Descartes could somehow read the first few chapters of The Problems of Philosophy, he would maybe be both in agreement and disagreement of Russell's theory concerning the existence of matter. First off, Descartes would agree that nothing is exactly as it is made out to be because our senses