Democracy in Action

Rogelio Simon Jr.                                                                                  152393

Democracy in Action

        “Can democracies protect the public at large – unorganized individuals—against well-organized special interests?” a line or rather a question from Alan Ryan’s On Politics: A History of Political Thought: From Herodotus to the Present, the question that which plagues all modern democracies and somehow the foundation of this paper (2012).

Now we already know what democracies are, its aspects, components, and purposes, and how it holds its rulers accountable for their action in the public realm, who are also acting through competition and coordination, and how it helps the betterment of its citizens (Miranda, 2011). But that is a rather very superficial definition and only gives us a clear distinction on what democracies, liberal democracies, are today we with this paper we will know what they ought to be.

        We must break down Ryan’s question to understand what it is asking before we can answer it. The first part is the public at large. Now what is the individual? According to Flathman, individuals are those parts of groups or other entities larger than individuals and they treat individuating characteristics as functions of group life. That means that any individual, person, or citizen is part of a larger class or strata that treat their own individual actions and personalities as a contribution to the so called class (1992). But what if these individuals are unorganized, According to Ryan, these are the less-off, the incompetent many, the people that will not unite due to differing ideas and interests, thus they are the public at large, which represents the public as a whole, a body of differing interests and goals (2012). But, according to Rousseau, Swiss-Born French Philosopher (Cranston, 2017), everyone submits himself to the General Will, that which considers only the common interest, whereas the will of all is just the sum of particular wills; therefore it takes private interest into account, so even though they are not united per se, they are still part of a whole, that which wants to achieve a common goal or good (general will) (Ebenstein & Ebenstein, 2013).

        Now what is the second part, the well-organized special interests? According to Ryan, we could assume or infer that these special interests are the goals and ambitions of the “well-off”, the adept elites or rather the politician/s, at least in previous Athenian standards, that has the majority of influence and economic power in society that which they can influence and/or “exploit” the less-off, the masses to do these “special interests”. In other words, these are the plans and goals of modern day statesmen and politicians that require the active participation of the people, either for their good or for the bad (2012).

Now let us put this into the context of liberal democracies. In liberal democracies, according to Schmitter & Karl, the politicians must adhere and listen to the interests of the masses, as they (the masses) have the superior power over the politicians, are the ones who have elected these politicians into positions of power and because it is the politicians mandate and obligation to serve the people (1991). But can democracies protect the masses against these politicians, in spite of them being drastically less influential and powerful? Yes. Through political institutions, a system of checks and balances, and public unity can democracies protect the public at large—unorganized individuals—against well-organized special interests.

According to Fukuyama there are three sets of institutions to achieve a politically developed liberal democracy. First there is the State, a hierarchical, centralized organization that holds monopoly on legitimate force over a defined territory, this is to say that the government as a whole, and not select persons of high authority, has the real and legitimate power over the people. Another is the Rule of law, or the set of rules of behavior, reflecting broad consensus within society, that is binding on even the most powerful actors in society. In other words, man must be ruled by laws, not by force (2014). According to Locke (Ebenstein & Ebenstein) laws must have 2 core components, that it must apply equally to all and that it must be designed for the common good of the people (2013). The third is Democratic Accountability, where the government is responsive to the interests of the whole society rather than its own interest, and in the event of fault, officials responsible for the wrongdoing can be justly punished (Fukuyama, 2014), with all this power all over the place in democracies and the amount of trust given to elected people there must be a way of controlling and monitoring authority and power.

Thus a system check and balances between the branches is vital for the separation of powers and the efficient and legal passing of laws and bills which also help the public from malicious interests/plans (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). According to Przeworski, the 4th and 5th Athenian democracy, the first democracy, was considered a large success due to its elaborate system of checks and balances, which prevented rash decisions by the citizens (which are statesmen and politicians in modern day comparison) and abuse of power by military and high political leaders. In modern day liberal democracy, at least in the Republic of the Philippines, there are three branches, namely the executive, judicial and legislative. While each branch has their own independent functions, they are also interdependent on each other for fulfilling their full and efficient purposes (Relacion & Magalzo, 2014).