Dereliction Of Duty

"...I am now going to my grave with that lapse in moral courage."

Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff 1964-1968

The 1997 book, Dereliction of Duty, may become a critical treatise in the area of military ethics.[1] The research was

extensive (some 5 years), although it was primarily descriptive without incisive analysis or critique. Ironically, that may be the

most powerful aspect of the book. The facts and information are systematically laid out, and there is no doubt that the added

information will provide insights in both policy and military perspectives; the facts add weight to a number of previous theories.

Now, we may have a new theory--the Vietnam War would never have been fought if it had not been for the Joint Chiefs of

Staff (JCS): "The disaster in Vietnam was not the result of impersonal forces but a uniquely human failure, the responsibility for

which was shared by President Johnson, and his principal military and civilian advisors."[2] The book illuminates the critical

importance of strong and honorable character for military leaders, especially senior military leadership: "The military...engaged

in a mutually deceitful relationship, in that they did not question a strategy that they knew to be fundamentally flawed and instead

went along with the game."[3] It appears that some in the JCS went along "with the game" to protect the opportunity to further

the interests of their own service over the welfare of the nation, while other JCS members were misguided by conflicts of

loyalty.

Interest in Dereliction of Duty has spread throughout military circles, with an unprecedented degree of attention and

influence.[4] Many Air Force members have purchased this book, especially after a Wall Street Journal article stated that it

had a significant influence on General Ronald Fogelman's decision to resign.[5] According to Air Force Major General (Ret)

Perry Smith, who has known Gen Fogelman for 20 years, "He told me that Dereliction of Duty had a powerful influence on

his thinking."[6] This paper will examine some possible implications of this book to include character-related issues, and

options for military leaders when they are confronted with profound ethical issues or concerns. Additionally, the delicate issue

of military dissent, and a focus on a systemic personnel issue, the "up-or-out" promotion system.

This book calls into question former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's revisionist account constructed in his

book, Retrospect. Certainly, McNamara has been a villain in many Vietnam postmortems, and this book does not diminish

that charge. However, what it uncovers is that others were not only guilty of a "dereliction of duty," but there was a

fundamental breakdown in moral character-- with a requisite lack of moral courage. Ironically, it appears that one of the first

casualties of the Vietnam War was the truth--it was shaded, evaded, spinned, and thinned!

President Johnson's first meeting with the JCS set an important tone. He expected their unqualified support.[7]

General Maxwell Taylor (former Army Chief of Staff under Eisenhower and Chairman, JCS under Kennedy and Johnson)

selected General Earle Wheeler for Army Chief of Staff because he believed Wheeler could be counted on for his personal

loyalty and support. [8] General Wheeler was predisposed to support the administration's policy because he owed his position

to Taylor. The book incriminates Maxwell Taylor for not only lying to LBJ about the views of the chiefs, but also deceiving the

chiefs about the president's policy aims. Equally contemptuous was the narrow-minded rivalry between services coupled with

loyalty to individual service over Constitution and country.

One example of service loyalty was a running feud among the JCS members regarding who was to be the next

CINCPAC. The Chiefs had ranked the candidates from the three services and General Jacob Smart of the USAF was the

winner. Admiral David McDonald, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), was dismayed because that command had always

been under Navy control. Admiral McDonald went directly to Secretary McNamara and pleaded his case. McNamara

intervened and selected a naval officer. McDonald felt indebted to McNamara. "McDonald, who had hitherto opposed

McNamara's plans, no longer objected to them outside JCS meetings."[9]

Later, when policies went counter to the Chief's recommendations, McDonald and Wheeler indicated their reluctance

to challenge policy decisions already made "at the highest level."[10] Secretary McNamara appeared to want courtiers[11] and

sycophants: "...advisors who would tell him what he wanted to hear...those who expressed views that ran counter to his

priorities would hold little sway..."[12] "Kennedy and later Johnson didn't really want military advice from the Chiefs. They

wanted people who would be acquiescent, who would be malleable."[13]

When the JCS went to the Hill to testify in July 1965, the Chiefs were expected to lie