Descriptive and Normative Ethics

To understand Descriptive and Normative Ethics and the value they bring to philosophy they, like any philosophical term, must have clear and concise definitions with which to formulate their place within the philosophical hierarchy. Descriptive Ethics is the practice of describing the action itself it explains what is done not what ought to be done. If I were to say, “Some parts of the United States practice capital punishment.” I would be practicing Descriptive Ethics. In comparison, Normative Ethics is the practice of making a judgment either for or against a behavior, or explaining the reason for the behavior. Descriptive ethics attempts to explain what ought to be done not what is done. If I were to keep with the example, capital punishment, and I said, “Capital punishment is immoral because murder is never acceptable regardless of the party committing it.” I would be demonstrating Normative Ethics. In order for me to deliberate the value of a moral judgment, I must first precisely define the behavior to identify what the core of the moral dilemma is. I cannot adequately find the answer to a question that has yet to be defined. The argument I then present for or against my judgment, or in the explanation of the action pertaining to its’ morality would qualify as a Normative Ethical theory. Simply put the importance of Descriptive and Normative Ethical theory is that they are at the root of every philosophical argument.

An ethical theory that falls within the frame of Descriptive ethics would be cultural relativism. When the father of anthropology Franz Boas began observing other cultures he had to state the actions that he observed for the ethnography of said culture. The primary principle of anthropology is to always be a constant observer without judgment. The observations that Franz Boas, or any other anthropologist, writes into their ethnography is a description of what is observed not a measurement of the ethical value of the action. Cultural