Epistemological Holism

Introduction

Theory of knowledge, or epistemology, as a philosophic discipline finds its roots in Plato’s dialogues. It is in the dialog Theaetetus where we find that Plato gives his account of what Socrates considers knowledge. Knowledge for the ancient Greeks was not only true, but also justified. Thus the knowledge as �justified true belief’ (JTB) thesis was born. This main idea held for over 2500 years with philosophers quibbling primarily over how beliefs were justified. Then, in the 1960’s, Edmund Gettier published an essay which set the epistemological world on fire. Aptly titled, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Gettier's essay gives two examples in which most would agree that the subject’s belief is both true and justified but which we would not claim to be knowledge. Since the Gettier paper, a wide array of positions, both for and against the JTB thesis have been offered. It is my intent to give an overview of several of these positions, various reasons for their dismissal, and offer my own, holistic view of what knowledge is.

The best place to begin, as they say, is at the beginning. Therefore it is with a brief discussion of knowledge as justified true belief, foundationalism, coherentism, and hybrid theories that I shall begin. Next, an analysis of Gettier’s paper and its implications for the JTB thesis will be discussed. Various replies to Gettier, such as Goldman’s externalism, Churchland’s non-sententialism, Rorty's pragmatism, fallibilism, and anti-individualism will then be surveyed. Finally, once each of the traditional views on epistemology have been surveyed and found lacking in one way or other, I shall put forward a mixed thesis of holism covering accounts of both a priori and a posteriori knowledge which I believe is a more accurate reflection of how it is that knowledge as a human endeavor continues to march forward in both relevancy and usefulness.

In the Platonic dialog where we first find a discussion of what knowledge is, Socrates and Theaetetus discuss three possible ways in which knowledge can be had. Is knowledge nothing but perception? Or is knowledge simply true judgment? Is knowledge simply true judgment with an account? Through the dialog, each of these is denied as satisfactory accounts of what knowledge is since counter-examples can be found to each. Plato leaves us to our own devices as to what knowledge actually is as the dialog ends with Socrates having to leave to answer the charges against him at the courthouse. However, it is clear that while none of these three possibilities alone is sufficient to define knowledge Plato wants us to see that when the three are combined, one can be said to have knowledge. That is, one can be said to have knowledge when one perceives something, makes a true judgment of it, and gives reasons for his position. Thus the justified true belief account of knowledge was born.

Justification as Foundational

Since the time of Plato until the mid twentieth century philosophers accepted this tripart definition and concerned themselves primarily with how one could be said to be justified. On one view, justification rests upon certain foundational beliefs which are self-justified. From these foundational beliefs, using the laws of inference, one may justify more robust positions as knowledge. This view is commonly referred to as foundationalism. One prominent foundationalist was the French philosopher Rene Descartes. From his “clear and distinct” perception that “'I am, I exist' is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind.”(Descartes,18) This insight, known as the Latin phrase cogito ergo sum, or I think therefore I am, is the foundation for Descartes' further ruminations about the world.

For the logical positivists, however, knowledge could not have an a priori basis. After all, knowledge is usually about the world, and therefore any knowledge of it should properly find its foundation in statements about the world. These so-called 'protocol statements' are said to be “at the beginning of science”(Schlick, 414). Because of certain issues outside the scope of this paper, Schlick is led to reformulate such 'protocol statements' as what he refers to as 'konstatierungen.' These empirical observations equate to such things as 'here, now, red' when one observes something red, and serve as the self-justified foundation for knowledge according to Schlick.

The Coherentist and Hybrid Views of Justification

Other philosophers, however, deny such foundational statements by claiming that they are defined only as they relate to other concepts and it is in this so-called coherence with the 'web of belief' that such statements are justified. For example, my observation that the page I am looking at is white with black marks is only true insofar as I have a concept of what white is, what black is, what marks are, and the concept of the relation contained in the word with. In this manner the so-called coherentist philosophers, such as Laurence BonJour, attempt to undermine the foundationalist view of the justification of knowledge. It is important to note that, on my view, the coherentist generally fails to fully appreciate the nature of what it is that Schlick suggests. The coherentist will claim that even konstatierungen are subject to the prior existence of the conceptual space in which the observation statements are made, however, I believe that they are falling victim to the trap of being caught up in the limits of words. For me, Schlick's view is best understood as having konstatierungen exist prior to any mental perception at all. That is, such entities, if they exist, are tautological with the world as it presents itself. However, due to the conceptual nature of language, explanation of such entities is inherently tied to certain conceptual frameworks and thus becomes a target of the coherentist attack. Perhaps a better way to understand these konstatierungen is to discuss properties of light. If there is indeed a physical world, and our scientific theories of the nature of light are true, then the light waves (or particles) that interact with my eyes and thus produce the sense impression of my seeing this page are in no way conceptual. They simply ARE the truth of the external world as it presents itself. As these light rays interact with my visual sensory equipment, they become possible entities of conceptualization, however, in my mind, the simple act of observation requires no conceptual framework since I am simply observing things as they appear.