Famine, Affluence, And Morality

In Peter Singer's "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", he argues that the way people in relative affluent countries react to a situation like that in Bengal cannot be justified. His reason for saying this is due to his belief in his principle "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally to do it". I disagree with his point of view and I will provide explanations as well as bring in my own arguments to show why I refuse to accept his said conclusion.

Singer begins with the assumption that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad. Therefore, according to his principle, we must to our best prevent situations such as that in Bengal where people die from lack of food, shelter and medical care, from happening (by donating money), without sacrificing anything comparably important. We could deny this assumption but in doing so, we would not be honest to ourselves.

Assuming the Principle of Universalizability, he claims that it makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbour's child ten yards away or a Bengali stranger who is ten thousand yards away. I will challenge this assumption by modifying his example: There are two people drowning in a pool, one is your cousin and the other is a stranger. You will almost instinctively swim towards your drowning cousin because you will feel more morally obliged to save him than to save stranger. What if the two people drowning are both strangers, one is an old lady and the other is a young man? Naturally, you will feel more morally obliged to save the old lady because she appears weaker as compared to the healthy young man. This goes to show that there will always be a moral difference in choosing who to help. Human nature is such that people will tend to be bias towards the person who gives them a greater/ better impression. No two people will give a third person the same impression and thus, Principle of Universalizability does not hold.

With the global development of instant communication and swift transportation, Singer holds the view that it is now possible for aid to effectively transcend geographical boundaries. Together with his assumption of the Principle of Universalizability (which we have already shown to not hold), it is thus unjustifiable for us to discriminate who to help based on geographical boundary. However, I feel that this is not a strong argument as instant communication and swift transportation does not necessarily mean that aid would be more effectively transported. The bureaucratic processes that famine relief has to go through are not swift and instant as Singer claims. This, together with the existence of corrupted and profit organisations, makes people question the proportion of money donated that actually reaches the people suffering from starvation. Therefore, it is illogical to expect us to irrationally donate as much as we can.

Singer also argues that if the number of people in the same situation as we are does make a difference, there will not be enough to provide the needy with food as people will not be obliged to donate more than what everyone else has donated. Thus, by giving more we will prevent more suffering than if we gave only what we were obliged to. Ironically, because it follows that we ought to give as much as possible, there will be more than can be used for the benefit of the refugees and some sacrifice would have been unnecessary. This absurd consequence arises only if we assume that the act of donation is performed simultaneously and unexpected. Since this assumption is unsound (logically, one would be expecting everyone else to donate if the act of donation is simultaneous), the absurd consequence cannot happen and therefore, the number of people in the same situation as we are does not make a difference. This argument denies the antecedent and is thus an invalid form of argument.

For the above two reasons, I would say that the way people in relative affluent countries react to a situation like that in Bengal can well be justified.

Based on his principle, Singer concluded that it is wrong for people living in affluence to not donate the money which they would otherwise have spent on unimportant things. It is then unjustifiable to label this act of giving money to save someone else from starvation as an act of charity. In my opinion, we are not obliged to donate