Hitler

Running Header: Age Discrimination

Age Discrimination

Sprint/United Management Company вЂ" Petitioner

V.

Ellen Mendelsohn

MBA 535

Melvia C. Usury

April 26, 2008

Table of Contents

I. Introduction

II. History

III. Reaction

IV. Court Decision

V. Age Discrimination Effect on Society and Economy

VI. Conclusion

A brief look into the case of Sprint/United Management Company v. Mendelsohn is a look into Age Discrimination. Is Age Discrimination a fact or a process of disregarding an aging viable workforce? What is Age Discrimination and did age play a factor in this case? Age Discrimination is defined as a, choice for hiring, termination, or adverse employment action based solely on the worker’s age over age 40 (2004 Tennessee Employment Law Center). Although, theoretically the word discrimination can refer to discrimination against any age group, age discrimination usually comes in one of three forms; discrimination against youth, which is also called 'adultism'; discrimination against those 40 years old or older and discrimination against elderly people. In the United States, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits employment discrimination nationwide based on age with respect to employees 40 years of age or older. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act also addresses the difficulty older workers face in obtaining new employment after being displaced from their jobs, arbitrary age limits. In many countries, companies more or less openly refuse to hire people above a certain age despite the increasing lifespan and average age of the population. The reasons for this range from vague feelings that younger people are more "dynamic" and create a positive image for the company, to more concrete concerns about regulations granting older employees higher salaries or other benefits without these expenses being fully justified by an older employees' greater experience.

The case of Sprint/United Management Company v. Ellen Mendelsohn, is one of and employee being downsized from the company and viewing the dismissal based on age. Ellen Mendelsohn was employed in the Business Development Strategy Group of petitioner Sprint/United Management Company (Sprint) from 1989 until 2002, when Sprint terminated her as a part of an ongoing company-wide reduction in force. She sued Sprint under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. Ð'§621 et seq., alleging disparate treatment based on her age. In support of her claim, Mendelsohn sought to introduce testimony by five other former Sprint employees who claimed that their supervisors had discriminated against them because of age. Three of the witnesses alleged that they heard one or more Sprint supervisors or managers make remarks denigrating older workers.

Respondent Mendelsohn’s age discrimination case, petitioner Sprint moved in limine to exclude the testimony of former employees alleging discrimination by supervisors who had no role in the employment decision Mendelsohn challenged, on the ground that such evidence was irrelevant to the case’s central issue, see Fed. Rules Evid. 401, 402, and unduly prejudicial, see Rule 403. Granting the motion, the District Court excluded evidence of discrimination against those not “similarly situated” to Mendelsohn. The Tenth Circuit treated that order as applying a per se rule that evidence from employees of other supervisors is irrelevant in age discrimination cases, concluded that the District Court abused its discretion by relying on the Circuit’s Aramburu case, determined that the

evidence was relevant and not unduly prejudicial, and remanded for a new trial. (No. 06вЂ"1221. Argued December 3, 2007вЂ"Decided February 26, 2008)

The petitioners basic principal of evidence and need for foundation explains why the court of appeals should be reversed.