Identity Theory

Where is your mind? Is it in your brain? If you do not know, then you need to sit down and read ahead. There are mysterious mechanisms inside your brain. Your brain prevails thoughts, beliefs, etc. And your mind can develop the same things. Really think about it: your mind does what your brain does. Or maybe your mind is an engine for your brain. Maybe your brain is a tangible, stable substance for your mind. Many scholars have come across with ideas of how the brain and mind intertwine. As you can see (and know) that everyone have thoughts, dreams, etc. But how the brain keeps hold of all and when the mind comes along? Do you even take notice whether or not your mind is your brain?

Well, this is an argument that many philosophers have spent years of doing. To this day, many cannot agree with the conclusion. However, they have come up with terms that embodies their study: type identity theory and functionalism. (Yes, there are many more terms that follows. But let’s focus these two. Shall we?)

Let’s take a look at identity theory. It is the view that a particular mental state is identical to a particular physical state. Say that you are in a certain mood, like excited. You are mentally in an excited mood. Your brain is also experiencing an exciting occurrence. Therefore, your mind is your brain. (Mind=Brain.) It a theory the three scholars, Smart, Place, and Fiegel, proposed in 1959. They all want to have a term that summarizes of analyzing mental events. If you are feeling sad, your brain as well would react as if it is sad with its axons and neurons.

And there is one man who begs to differ. Hilary Putnam explained “that what makes something a type of mental state isn’t its physical nature, but rather the role that it plays in the creature’s functioning” (Gomez-Lavin). That is what the term functionalism comes about. Functionalism is the theory that objects the idea of the type identity theory. Its mental states are individuated by the functional roles they play in a creature’s life. That means that the brain is not the mind. If I say, "I am in pain," it is not the same as saying, "The C-fibres in my brain are firing". But, if the mind and the brain are identical, shouldn't these two statements mean the same thing? According to functionalism, it is not.

These two theories bring out a whole new spectrum for these two philosophers: Nagel and Lewis. Nagel