Intention Interference With Contractual Relations

ARGUMENT

The Court must grant the Springfield's motion for Summary Judgment because: (1) the relevant facts of this case fail to establish improper interference with the Shelbyville's contractual relations; and (2) Shelbyville cannot establish issues of material fact establishing Springfield's actions meet the standard set forth in M.G.L. 63A Ð'§ 11. Furthermore, should this case proceed to trial any evidence regarding the prior convictions of Springfield witness Wayland Smither's must be ruled inadmissible as mandated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 609(b).

I. THE COURT MUST GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS OF INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS AND 93A VIOLATIONS BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT REQUIRE FURTHER ADJUDICATION.

Summary Judgment must be granted in cases where there is no dispute regarding any genuine issues of material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. The burden of proving there are no genuine issues of material fact rests with the party seeking summary judgment. id. Once met, the opponent to the motion must provide evidence that a dispute exists beyond a simple denial to the claims of the moving party. id. The Court should grant Springfield's motion for Summary Judgment because: (1) the legally relevant facts of this case fail to establish that Springfield improperly interfered with the Plaintiff's contractual relations; and (2) The Defendant cannot show that Springfield's actions meet the standard of "rascality" set forth in M.G.L. 63A Ð'§ 11.

A. Springfield's Filing Of Litigation And The Accompanying Lis Pendens Against Shelbyville Constituted a Proper Defense Necessitated By Shelbyville's Breach Of Contract And Therefore Do Not Establish That Springfield Acted With Improper Means Or Motive.

A Plaintiff must prove four primary elements to establish a case of intentional interference with contractual relations; (1) the existence of a contract or business relationship that seeks an economic benefit; (2) an awareness on behalf of the defendant that such a contract or relationship did exist; (3) the Defendant's intentional interference was motivated by an improper means or purpose; and (4) a showing that the Plaintiff suffered damages resulting from the alleged interference. United Truck Leasing Corp. Inc., v. Geltman, 406 Mass. 811 (1990). The interfering act must be volitional and improper. Id. at 815. To determine if a Defendant acted improperly it is necessary to consider all relevant circumstances. G.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. Falmouth Marine, Inc., 410 Mass. 262 (1991). An act can be labeled improper when committed in direct violation of statute or common law. United at 815. Unavoidable interference can arise as a consequence of legitimate efforts to protect or further business ends. G.S. Enterprises at 268. Motive may be improper when the conduct was wholly or partially undertaken to achieve the interference or to otherwise injure. United, 406 Mass at 816.

Litigation can justify interference when the Plaintiff sues to protect or assert a legitimate right. G.S. Enterprises, Inc. 410 Mass. at 268. However litigation may amount to improper conduct when the Plaintiff does not have probable cause to believe the action will succeed or has filed suit for reasons other than having the claim properly adjudicated. Id. Similarly the utilization of a lis pendens is proper when filed over a dispute regarding title or when the rights to use and occupy the land need judicial intervention. Mass. Gen. L. c. 184 Ð'§ 15 (2005).

Attendant circumstances are relevant when assessing the legitimacy of the use of legal process. G.S. Enterprises, Inc. 410 Mass. At 268. In G.S. Enterprises, Inc. the Defendant tried to purchase an adjoining marina when it became available for sale. Id. Their motivation to purchase the property was to prevent development in the area; this was made evident by correspondence and statements made by the defendant to various parties to the deal. Id. at 264-267. The defendant made two separate offers to purchase the property; upon learning the first offer was rejected they increased the offer amount. On both occasions the Defendant was told that acceptance was contingent upon approval by the board of directors. Id. When the Defendant learned that the property was sold to developers they filed suit for specific performance and a lis pendens, alleging their first offer was an enforceable purchase and sale agreement. Id at 269. Based upon the details of the proposed transaction and the defendants statements before and after the sale was finalized the Court called into question the legitimacy of the defendants claim seeking specific performance. Id. The court found the assertion that the first offer was an enforceable contract difficult to believe based on the fact the Defendant made a second offer for a larger sum of money.

Interference alone cannot be improper. United, 406 Mass. at 811. In United Truck Leasing Inc. (United) the Defendant was sued after one of the Plaintiff's customers broke a leasing contract at the Defendant's advice. The Defendant was advising the third party in matters relating to the trucking business. id. Evidence showed the defendant knew of the existing contract; that he intentionally acted to the detriment of the Plaintiff, and that the Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the defendants' advice. Id. at 814. The court held that intentional interference alone fails to establish liability. Id. The Court reasoned that if a showing of intentional interference was all that is required it would make "otherwise legitimate persuasion" actionable. Id. Thus interference must be illegal in and of itself [in violation of statute or common law] or was motivated by a desire to do harm. Id. Because there was no showing of improper or malicious intent the Court found for the Defendant. Id.

Although Burn's actions were volitional and deliberate they fail to meet the standard of improper or malicious intent set forth in United. Id. at 814-818. Burn's was attempting to further Springfield's financial interests. Interference with the contractual relationship between Shelbyville and Isotope was an unavoidable consequence resulting from the proper motive of furthering legitimate business interests. Springfield and Shelbyville entered into a legally binding contract on Feb 2, 2005. The contract stipulated that Shelbyville would not negotiate with other potential buyers during the environmental remediation process. Shelbyville began negotiations with Isotope on March 3, 2005 despite this agreement. When Shelbyville began negotiating with Isotope Springfield's environmental team was still working