International Relatins (Japan-Turkey)

Japan is the World's largest aid donor, and Japan provides much of this aid to Turkey. It invests in Turkey because in the Middle East, Turkey is the only democratic country. Turkey is a developing country with a stable government so it is a good investment. Further, Japan does not have a strong army; therefore, Japan wants Turkey's partnership because Turkey has strong military power. However, to specifically understand the reasons for Japanese aid to Turkey, one must first analyze Japan's aid policy and then specifically her aid policy towards the Middle East and Turkey.

Long (1999) argued that conventional wisdom views Japanese economic assistance as either a response to foreign (primarily US) pressure or her desire to expand export and investment markets for Japanese firms. Some have suggested that Japanese aid reflects a security dimension as part of her pursuit of a comprehensive security. Comprehensive security includes economic security, access to raw materials and energy and the overall maintenance of peace and stability, especially in the regions of greatest concern to Japan.

As Dowty (2000) shows, the Middle East is perhaps the most important area concerning Japan's prosperity considering her navy dependence on Middle East oil. Infact, Japan is the World's largest oil importer. Nevertheless Japan's level of involvement in the Middle East has been relatively low. Considering that Japan remains the World's largest aid donor basically because Japan has few other mechanisms for pursuing its national security interests, as pointed out by Long (1999). For instance, foreign aid to the Middle East after peaking at 24,5 percent of Japan's total overseas developmental assistance budget in 1977, declined to around to 10 percent in the 1980s, and to 6,8 percent in 1995.

Moreover, reasons cited by Dowty (2000) include lack of any background of historic ties of domestic pressure groups like in the Western nations and the insularity of Japanese culture. Beyond these, the legacy of World War Two and the consequent and antimilitary constitution has further encouraged a foreign policy that is reactive rather than assertive.

Another factor explaining Japanese policy towards the Middle East or elsewhere involves her relationship with the United States. Dowty (2000) emphasizes that the ties with the United States appeared to be the most important key to understanding both past Japanese passivity in the Middle East and recent changes in this stance.

Additionally, to expand the United States alliance imposes serious constraints on independent action in the Middle East but at the same time it provides Japan with a luxury of such action. Both Japan and the United States are interested in achieving political stability maintaining oil supplies to the Western countries and promoting economic developmental in the region.

Both Long (1999) and Dowty (2000) identify three layers to Japanese Middle Eastern policy. The first layer concerns the promotion of peace and neutrality. The second concerns Japan's identification with the United States' leading effort to maintain Middle East stability. The third concerns Japanese efforts to stake out an independent Japanese role. In a historical review tracing Japanese involvement in the Middle East, one can see that the major change in Japanese political and economical involvement in the Middle East began in 1973 in response to OPEC's oil embargo. Whereas before, the overwriting purpose of Japan's aid policy was the promotion of Japanese exports in Asian markets, Japan now offered aid assistance to the Arab states in a successful attempt to have the embargo lifted from Japan.

Yet, while doing so Japan also was singled it out for special pressure to take a more

pro-Arab position. Namely, opposition to the acquisition of territory by force, a consequent demand for withdrawal of Israeli forces from all territories occupied in 1967, and support for the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. This move was heralded as the first serious crack in the United States - Japanese alliance. Moreover, in the end the gesture brought little or no benefit to Japan as the impact of the oil crisis was not lessened. This episode made Japan realize that independent short term Japanese policies might gain nothing while still exacting a cost in relations with the United States.

On the other hand, the fall of the Shah of Iran in early 1970 was a clear reminder that total reliance on United States policy might not be the ticket either. Japan was therefore much better prepared for the challenge of 1990-1991 Gulf War than it had been for the earlier oil crisis. Consequently the "Check Book Diplomacy" of the Golf crises was not trivial: Japan gave 2, 5 billion dollars to the frontline nations of Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Syria and 11 billion dollars to the coalition (Dowty 2000). The military action against Iraq brought about a rapid fall in oil prices that had been inflated by the prewar crises, providing a story of justification for Japan, as a major beneficiary of the price drop, to make a substantial contribution. Viewing the Arab boycott as an impediment to free trade the break through in Israeli PLO relations in September 1993 made clear that the Arab-Israel peace process was a development highly favorable to Japanese interests, since it promised to open up a large new economic space with no barriers and many new opportunities.

It can be seen that Japan's policy in the Middle East has moved from a vague support of peace and concern about specific economic interests to a greater focus on long-term stability. As stated by the former Japanese prime Minister Takeo Miki, peace in the Middle East must be achieved for, the regions as more than an energy problem. The peace issue is a political, strategic and economic problem. Reflecting Japan's security concerns, the Official Development assistance (ODA) Program defined the security related goals that influence offers of economic assistance, more sharply.

Beginning in 1990 the ODA charter included a clear non-proliferation objective. As Long (1999) outlines, in making aid decisions, policy should consider trends in military expenditures, development and production of weapons of mass distraction and missiles, exports or imports of arms and, democratization efforts for development of market oriented economies and states of human rights and freedom.

Aid to Turkey, rather than being centered on non-proliferation efforts, falls into the final category. Additionally, Japan regards Turkey as one of its most important aid recipients in the Middle East. The specific reasons behind Japanese aid to Turkey maybe cited as follows: Firstly, Turkey is an important nation that contributes to regional stability with its moderate