Irony

Abstract

My paper deals with responses to conversational irony in two different contexts. As

an interaction analyst I am interested in how interlocutors co-construct the whole

conversational sequence, in what they do with the ironic act in reacting to it.

I combine data analytic methods from interactional sociolinguistics with questions

from cognition theory. I shall point out how the interaction analysis of different

response types contributes to the development of irony theory.

A look at two data sets (informal conversations among friends and pro- and con-TV-

discussions) provides interesting differences in responses to irony in these contexts.

One important difference in responding appears to depend on whether the irony is

framed and understood as critical or as friendly. From the format of the responses we

can often access the processing of the ironic (though not always). If there are

responses to the literal meaning and to the implicatum, we can take this as evidence

that principally both the implicated and the literal message is processed. We find five

response types: Responses to the literal, to the implicated, mixed types, just laughter

and ambiguous types which do not allow us to assign a meaning. The data further

confirm that the different types of responses to irony create different activity types:

Responses to the literal develop a humorous discourse type of joint teasing. These are

highly frequent during the dinners among friends. In the context of pro and con

debates responses within the group differ in connection to the line of arguing.

Responses to the implicatum are much more frequent here. They recontextualize the

Page 2

serious debate. Very often, those who share the general opinion of the ironist, laugh -

those who do not reject the implication of the ironic act.

1. Introduction

This paper is contributing to a neglected area of irony research, the reception of irony

in contexts of face-to-face interaction. I would like to show that the reception of irony

in different conversational contexts can give us insights into the way irony is

processed. I cast a critical glance at cognition-oriented irony research which works

with data from lab settings. The greatest differences between lab situations and

natural conversations are: (a) in the first type of situation the irony recipients are not

affected by the ironic act and (b) have no opportunity to continue the interaction and

thus to shape and co-construct it. I have reason to think that the way an addressee is

affected by the ironic act influences her or his response. I discuss the ironic in two

different contexts: in private conversations among good acquaintances and in pro and

con television discussions. I will show that in private conversations (where friendly

irony is displayed) people react more to what is said in the ironic act, while in

television discussions of controversial issues they react more to what is meant by the

(critical) ironic act. Previous irony research underestimated the fact that people

normally can react to both levels of meaning: to what is said and to what is

implicated, and thereby shape the meaning of the ongoing conversational sequence.

In particular, the double responses (to the dictum and the implicatum) which are also

present in both data sets suggest as well that both levels of expression are received.

This indicates that irony is a special case of communicating a cleft between the two

levels of dictum and implicatum. This cleft has to do with an evaluation contrast.

Let us first take a short glance at the long history of irony theory.

In Antiquity ironists were viewed, on the one hand, as deceivers, hypocrites and self-

righteous pretenders and, on the other, also as sensitive, modest persons who employ

understatement.

In his Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian classifies irony as a trope and figure of speech.

2

Page 3

Irony, however, is a type of allegory in which the opposite is expressed. The Romans call it

"illusio" (mocking). One recognizes this either from the tone in which it is spoken or from the

person affected or from the nature of the subject; for if something contradicts what is said, it is

clear that the speech wishes to say something different. (VII, 6, 54, my translation)

In irony, Quintilian maintains - building upon Cicero's comments on irony - the

speaker states the opposite of what he means and at the same time communicates that

the stated message is not the one intended. In the further history of the concept, the

notion of Ð''dissimulatio'

1

was emphasized