Man Becomes Who He Is

Man Becomes Who He Is

Aristotle discusses two different claims in Nichomachean Ethics that seems to have no connection. Aristotle's "proper function of man," which is an activity of the soul in relation with the rational principle, does not seem to connect with his later claim that, "men become just by performing just actions and self-controlled by practicing self-control," but the connection is made by Aristotle suggesting that the actions of man's soul, the nonphysical part of man or what man already possesses, is brought out by high standards, habit, and repetition, which will then lead to moral virtue.

First lets look at Aristotle's definition of the "proper function of man." In the middle of section seven of Book I, just after Aristotle defines "self- sufficient" and before concluding that section he discusses the "proper function of man," "The proper function of man then, consists in an activity of the soul in conformity with a rational principle or at least, not without it" (I, 7, 1098a 5-10). An activity of the soul is that which is nonphysical in human beings. We know this because in the beginning of section eight in Book I Aristotle divides the Good into three classes, "(1) external goods, (2) goods of the soul, and (3) goods of the body (I, 8, 1098b 10-15)." So if there are external goods and goods of the body then the goods of the soul are internal, the nonphysical part of man. This nonphysical part of man works with the rational element, man not just possessing reason but obeying it. Aristotle states this in Book I section seven in the

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middle just after the first mention of "the proper function of man" when he starts to explain rational element, "Since the expression Ð''life of the rational element' also can be used in two senses, we must make it clear that we mean a life determined by the activity, as opposed to the mere possession, of the rational element. For the activity, it seems, has a greater claim to be the function of man" (I, 7, 1098a 5-10). Here we see that the "proper function of man" is not just man having the ability to reason but using reason that the soul obeys.

What then is the action that comes from the soul obeying the rational element? This is evident in a man who has high standards. Aristotle discusses this in Book I section seven towards the end while he is explaining man's function:

In speaking of the proper function of a given individual we mean that it is the same in kind as the function of an individual who sets high standards for himself: the proper function of a harpist, for example, is the same as the function of a harpist who has set high standards for himself. The same applies to any and every group of individuals: the full attainment of excellence must be added to the mere function. In other words, the function of the harpist is to play the harp; the function of the harpist who has high standards is to play it well.

In order to reach man's proper function human beings need to set high standards in what they do. The activity of the soul that was discussed earlier needs to be accompanied with high standards. The active life of a man living out his function is a man who has high standards; he does what he does well. A human being reaches moral virtue then by doing their function well.

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This can be explained even in more detail as to how to live out high standards and to reach moral virtue. In Book II section one Aristotle starts off explaining the two kinds of virtue, "Moral virtue, on the other hand, is formed by habit, ethos, and its name, ethike, is therefore derived, by a slight variation, from ethos. This shows, too, that none of the moral virtues is implanted in us by nature, for nothing which exists by nature can be changed by habit" (II, 1, 1103a 15-20). Moral virtue is not something that human beings already