Mutual Assured Destruction

Kaitlin Abe

Instructor Pautz

HUM2020

17 April 2016

Mutual Assured Destruction

When Robert Oppenheimer constructed and detonated the first atomic bomb at Trinity on July 16, 1945 he could not possibly fathom the effects that the technology he let loose into the world would have on civilization and political standings (Boyer, 1985). With this new god like power that has been introduced the first thing the United States does is use it for the destruction of two cities in Japan. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were both devastated by the immense destructive power of the first nuclear weapon to be used as a weapon of war. This causes a huge uproar about the morality of MAD and the threatening of the killing of the innocent. Through many debates through history it really only boils down to two main strategies MAD and the strategy to limit nuclear capabilities in war (Kattenburg, 1983).

In order to give a complete description on these policies there are crucial things in history that must be addressed. The tension between the Soviets and the United States have been going on for many years. Since both are also highly developed in science and technology there has always been a bit of a power struggle. When the Atomic bomb was let loose in Alamogordo, New Mexico the Soviets only took a little over four years to officially detonate their own Atomic Bomb by following a blueprint stolen from Trinity, making the Soviets a rival to be trifled with now that the two countries share a power of extreme capability, thus throwing off the balance of the power scale and initiating the Cold War and the Great Arms Race (Kuran, 2001). With this race to create the most destructive weapon the United States began working on the first thermonuclear bomb or better known as the Hydrogen Bomb. In 1952 the detonation of the first Hydrogen bomb became an achievement for the United States (Kuran, 2001). With conflict of a questionable end with weapons that have the power to kill millions there must be some sort of policies put into place to ensure the survival of the human race even during times of all-out-war.

The first policy and the one that is being upheld today is MAD or the Mutually Assured Destruction Policy. This policy basically states that if a country conducts a nuclear attack on another country that the reciprocating country is allowed to attack with all their force including nuclear attack.  This policy was put into place to be a deterrent rather than as something to be implemented after the fact. MAD is in theory basically an international game of nuclear chicken played by the rulers of countries and suffered by their subjects. Although thinking of MAD one dimensionally this policy may seem barbaric and inconceivable that humans would create a mass nuclear genocide, destroying and killing millions because countries cannot come to terms about the right way to run a country.

There are many groups of people who are strongly against MAD because it supports the thought of limitless war that ultimately leads to escalation that has unlimited war. In the paper that Albert Wohlstetter wrote on the thoughts of the bombing of the innocent the first question is, “Must the West threaten innocent bystanders in order to deter nuclear war?” The answer is, Yes! Nuclear war is not a threat to a single country but on the planet itself that can only lead to a devastating and undesirable future because of the worldwide felt damage that would occur because of radiation and its contamination. With all of the power of a god in the hands of mere humans that are itching for a war the bombs should all be taken away, but there is no fail proof way to insure the dismantlement and destruction of nuclear bombs because of this fact the national safety that the United States would be giving up by destroying their nuclear Bombs without the total undeniable fact that all other weapons were destroyed by enemy combatants, discredit any hope for a Nuclear Bomb or weapon free society.

There have been thought of limiting the capability of the bomb by trying to attach a number of people that are morally and socially acceptable for a death toll caused by one of the counter attacks, but there in no one who is qualified to designate a number of that moral caliber. The detonation of a Nuclear Bomb on only military bases and structures were also suggested instead of the all-out response if attacked, to prevent the death of unarmed citizens (Wohlstetter, 1983). This policy may give the atomic bomb an almost not-so-bad feel that might lead to the future use of a bomb because the repercussions are thought to not be worth the gain.

In criminology there is a theory called the Crime Opportunity Theory which is based on deterrent and states that if a criminal has the opportunity to commit a crime and believes that they will not suffer repercussion that will outweigh the gain they will take the opportunity, but if there are systems or policies that are not in the favor of the criminal they are less likely to commit the crime intended (FBI, 2015). This theory can also be applied to MAD. If the Soviets know that the United States have systems and policies to reciprocate and counter an attack why would they initiate one if we would only in turn destroy them? It was mentioned that the soviets did not value their countries civilian lives as much as that of the Americans who strives to protect the innocent, giving the Soviets a so called advantage because of the Soviet’s ability to sacrifice civilian life in order for the success of the greater plan. This was seen in the years 1917 to 1922 when the Russian Civil War took place (EEB, 2014). During this time eight million of their citizens were killed in order to insure communism as the government operating policy. With that said the Soviets still need people to run a military. A threat to the civilians is a threat to the military because it can crumble a nation. A nation with no workers cannot continue to fight a war because there will be no production or material to create the weapons and supplies that are needed during a war (Rose, 2001).