Nationalism And Its Discontents

When analyzing the conflicts within Europe during the 20th century, it's seemingly plain to see that Europe's borders have changed significantly within the hundred year period. The Balkans, a region nestled in-between the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, and culturally and religiously defined by these empires, was an ever-changing landscape. For years the Croatians, Serbs and Muslims have waged war on one another in order to define their borders as strictly theirs. Tito's arrival in the 1950's and his autocratic, communist, and multi-ethnic state of Yugoslavia created stability within the region for almost four decades until his death in 1980. The fall of Tito's regime turned into the collapse of the entire state structure and created a nationalistic fervor that had been repressed since the days of the Ustache and Chetniks. Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the five republics that made up the former Yugoslavia, and it epitomizes the destructive effects of nationalism. Bosnia was predominantly Muslim, but with large populations of Croatians and Serbs exiting within the territory, as such, the difference in religion, culture and history would serve as a catalyst for one of the worst wars in recent memory.

One of the main reasons for the dawn of war in Bosnia actually occurs outside its borders. The civil war in Bosnia that raged throughout 1990's can be seen as a direct corollary to the actions taken by Franjo Tudjman, leader of the HDZ party and president of the newly independent Croatia. His actions were "seen as foolish and narrow-minded" and that he "needlessly alarmed and offended Croatia's Serb minority." Franjo Tudjman was the leader of the HDZ party (Croatian Democratic Alliance), and injected vast amount of nationalist sentiment into Croatians after the break-up of Yugoslavia. Alarmed by the rising tide of nationalism, Serbians sought to have a party which would represent Serbian interests within Croatia. Psychiatrist Dr. Jovan Raskovic and others around him formed the SDS party (Serbian Democratic Party) just in time for Croatia's first multi party elections in May 1990 . Although their party did well in areas such as Serb-dominated Knin and other small Serbian compacts they were otherwise dominated by the nationalistic HDZ party. These elections served a major blow to the Serbian SDS party that feared losing its personal and cultural autonomy with an independent Croatia. As the situation become more tense, the Serbian SDS party in Croatia elected a new leader, Milan Babic, who was seen as a "a power-hungry young politician" and it was under Babic that the party began take action and display a nationalistic fervor. Babic, in consultation with president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, had decided that they did not only want "the ejection of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia but ways in which predominantly Serbian-inhibited areas could be carved out of Croatia." Months to follow would see the Serbs and Croats battling for the eastern, Serb-inhibited part of Croatia which the Serbs would conquer, but alas would end up losing it back to the Croats in 1995 with the help of American and German forces. Even though the battle between the Serbs and Croats did not have a direct effect on Bosnia geographically or militarily, it would serve as a fueling force for Milosevic's "Greater Serbia" within Bosnia.

After the secession of Croatia and Slovenia from Yugoslavia, Bosnia as a state had made a conscious decision that it was going to secede from Yugoslavia as well. Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, was the model city by which Tito's anti-nationalist rhetoric worked towards but it was the centre of evils which would symbolize the Bosnian war. Sarajevo was not the only city in Yugoslavia where one could find men and women who rejected nationalist thinking and could live comfortably with people of all ancestries, but in Sarajevo this disposition "rested on tradition and enjoyed official sanction." It was developed as a predominantly Muslim city, but over time Sarajevo became home to orthodox Serbs, catholic Croats, Sephardic Jews and gypsies, and as it stood "in 1991 half of the city's 430,000 residents were non-Muslim." Due to Sarajevo's record of relatively peaceful interethnic life, Tito even considered making it the federal capital. Although they lost that campaign, they were rewarded when Sarajevo earned the right to host the 1984 Winter Olympics. "Sarjevans charmed visitors with their friendliness, their sophistication, and their apparent unity," but this apparent unity was soon going to turn friends against one another and split inter-ethic families that were once known as Yugoslavs, not merely as Serbs, Croats or Muslims.

When Bosnia put a proposal forth to the EC (European Council), it was met with opposition of Serbian nationalists that demanded that the Serbian minority within Bosnia required constitutional protection not as individuals but as a nation. Croatian nationalists also demanded wanted a mini-state within Bosnia, but were did not want to contest multi-ethnic Sarajevo as Croats only made up about 7% of Sarajevo's total population. However, Serb nationalists could not afford to lose their claim on Sarajevo as Serbs amounted to 25% of total population. The unique multicultural circumstances in Sarajevo had a more ideological character in the capital as opposed to the northern and eastern parts of the country where Serbs simply attacked the Muslims in order to seize their land. Serb leaders and largely, president Radovan Karadzic, leader of the SDS party, argued that "interethnic unity was a myth promoted by the Muslims, whose political party dominates the Bosnian government." Even though Muslim national party advocated an undivided Sarajevo, Serb Nationalists simply refuted that nation as their belief was that "Muslims' commitment to coexistence is meaningless because they outnumbered us (Serbs) and have nothing to fear from them."

The first step in the Serb nationalist strategy for Sarajevo was to expose the ethnic tensions that the Muslims and their government were allegedly concealing. The belief was that "if unacknowledged conflicts proved deep enough, Sarajevo would separate on its own as soon as the fault lines were revealed." The method behind this approach was that if this historical fault-line is emphasized often enough, the conflict between Serbs and Muslims is inevitable. However, it is not how the past dictates to the present but how the present manipulates the past which is decisive in Bosnia. Michael Ignatieff solidifies this point when he brings up that

"Freud once argued that the smaller the real difference between two peoples the larger it was bound to loom in