Political Science

Final Exam Review Sheet, December 10, 2016

* Explain the concept/theory

* Provide evidence/example about IOs

Recap

* 1. The politics of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)

* 2.Who determines the decisions of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)?

* 3. What is legal capacity, and how has it affected the representation of developing country interests at the WTO?

* 4. Why use formal, multilateral institutions rather than bilateral arrangements?

* 5. Flexibility provisions in international institutions

* 6. Barnett and Finnemore’s theory of international organizations’ bureaucracies. What are the interests of IGO bureaucrats and leaders, and in what ways do IGO bureaucracies autonomously influence outcomes in ways not intended by the member-states?

* 7. Peacekeeping: What are the varieties of peacekeeping operations? What kinds of cases get peacekeeping missions in the first place? What do peacekeeping operations do? What influence do they have on the likelihood of conflict recurrence or spread?

* 8. Why do governments sign human rights treaties, and what impact do such treaties have on state behavior?

* 9. The role of non-governmental organizations

Topics Addressed Since Midterm Exam

1. The politics of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)

1. What is ISDS, how does it work, and what institutions provide for this mechanism?

* Investor-state dispute settlement ISDS= a system through which companies can sue countries for discriminatory practices

* World trade organization WTO

1. Does ISDS and the threat of it affect state behavior or investor behavior? Why and under what circumstances?

* 1. What are some controversies regarding ISDS?

* 1. ISDS favor powerful countries

* ex:

* 2. Put countries’ business’s benefit at risk

* US citizens oppose TPP’s investor dispute settlement because they worry foreign companies can challenge US laws and potentially impose cost on taxpayers

1. Who determines the decisions of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)?

1. To what extent and under what conditions do powerful states get their way?

* 1. What are the different types of formal decision-making rules in IGOs? Effects?

* Majority

* UN

* Weighted

* IMF, World Bank

* Easier to be exploited by big powers

* Consensus

* Difficult to reach agreement

* WTO, NATO

1. In what ways can powerful states gain special influence over IGO decisions outside of the formal decision-making procedures?

* Informal= use threat of acting unilaterally as leverage

1. Why would powerful states agree to a formal voting rule that privileges smaller/weaker states?

* Legitimate big powers’ actions=formal rules induce small powers to join; legitimate IGO; legitimate big powers’ actions

1. What benefits do formal rules that privilege powerful states provide for small/weak states, if any? Why do the other IMF member-states tolerate US influence on the IMF? Do IGO structures ever serve the interests of small/poor/weak states, and under what conditions?

* When small states’ interest aligns with big states’

* Ex:

1. What are some consequences for IMF outcomes, and for the financial behavior of member-states and of private investors, of the existing IMF decision-making methods?

* Political lending= too big to fail countries receive more benefit (loans)

* South Korean receive huge loans in Asian financial crisis 1997

* Fragmentation= other member who are unsatisfied due to underrepresentation/voting system form their own lending organizations

* AIIB Asian infrastructure investment bank

* Big power failure= other members accumulate foreign exchange reserves hurt big power (US)’s economy by creating bubble= fake high USD exchange rate

1. Would the US and/or the rest of the world be better off if the US had less formal and informal influence on IMF decisions?

* Yes: decentralization will evenly distribute benefit to all member states

* No: harder to make decisions, risk of being exploited by non-democracies states

1. Do powerful states influence GATT/WTO outcomes, and if so, how?

2. Do powerful states influence UN Security Council outcomes, and if so, what is the evidence for it?

* P-5 member

1. What do weaker states get out of their membership in IGOs whose decisions are dominated by more powerful states?

2. Under what conditions do IGOs change their voting rules? Why has the UNSC not altered the procedures that give special weight to the interests of the US, and why has the IMF only done so this year?

1. What is legal capacity, and how has it affected the representation of developing country interests at the WTO?

* Legal capacity= resources and ability required to monitor and enforce rights in a complex legal system

* Unfair= ex: small= EC/France raised trade barrier to small/weak state Mauritania’s cheese export, exploited Mauritania’s lack of knowledge

1. Why use formal, multilateral