Stoicism

Stoicism vs. Platonism

There can be no doubt that ancient Greek philosophers contributed immensely to Western culture and are responsible for some of the most influential idea and systems of morality on the planet. From the first discussions of the material of the universe to the deliberations on the ideal government, nothing can be taken away from their work, whether it is agreed to be true or not. There is, however, a caveat to this praise that I feel must be addressed: most philosophers become more concerned with physics or metaphysics than with ethics, by which I mean finding the right way to live. Of course I don't mean to say that living correctly did not concern anyone, but what does seem to be of note is that many ethical systems come from metaphysical discussions. This is something that Stoic thinkers rebelled against. The groundwork for living has got to come from life in the real world, not some esoteric "forms." Of course the Stoics discussed metaphysics, and the nature of the universe, and many other topics, but here we are concerned primarily with happiness and living well. Stoicism is at its core a life philosophy and outlook on the world; that is far more important to the Stoics than the discourse on philosophical trifles.

Let us take as an example Plato's Forms and the Allegory of the Cave. How does this help men to live? What do we gain by believing that we are in The Matrix, or that we are the blind cave dwellers? We follow that white tail down the rabbit hole to see that we know nothing, and that all we have seen is false. We eventually come into the sun, and behold the Truth that is the penultimate forms of things. This mental game serves only to remind us that we do not necessarily know everything. We might not have learned of something, or we may be blind to it, but any logical discussion of knowledge would lead to this conclusion. One thing Plato does not discuss is what happens if we are not actually chained in the cave? What if we are standing in the sun in broad daylight already? What if somehow, by pure chance, everything we know happens to be absolutely correct, and we have attained wisdom, and we are contemplating our own blindness? The most important facet of this could be that the people in the cave are chained, but who has placed them there? It can be no one but themselves. The man who is free has become so of his own volition, by exercising his reason that the others forego. So, would he truly "think himself happy in the change and be sorry for them," (Baird and Kaufmann, 284) or look down upon them? Either of those responses would be ignoble; the Stoic would not feel sorry for them, as it is within their power to remove themselves from darkness, but he could not look down on them either, for they would still be his brothers, and their lack of vision cannot harm him in any way. There are obvious gains to be had in this pursuit. In contemplating the Allegory we have used our reason, a tool that must be constantly sharpened, and we have reaffirmed that we are imperfect and far from all-wise or all-knowing. We have learned again that forbearance for others is necessary, as the free man descends once again and is mocked (and would be killed) by his former comrades. But we also are reminded that none of this can actually harm us! We should not pity those chained, we should not fear their reprisal, and we should not fear the light. We are limited in wisdom but our reason is functioning and serves us well. All this is beneficial and good. But to think that we have learned anything new or been instructed in how to live in a new way is preposterous. Plato is so concerned with the idea of absolute Truth and the forms that exist outside of and above the world that he neglects his daily life. The Stoic is unconcerned with the idea of apple-ness. The concept has no use. Whether one believes in it or not, it is not a precept that can be applied to anything of import.

As stated, the Stoics did not feel that philosophy was a curious pastime or a body of knowledge. To them, philosophy was a practice, an exercise in daily living that was intended to bring about positive results. While they certainly would not begrudge the interesting philosophical discussion Plato (or any other thinker) might present, the main criterion is always going to be whether or not it can make a person better off and happier for having heard it. In general, any discussion can, at least in small part, accomplish this simply by being a beneficial mental exercise.

There are other seeming problems or inconsistencies within Stoicism, such as the idea (going back to the jug) that we are to be indifferent to everything. This is not quite what is meant by the Stoics. The Stoics propose that we should only desire to do or have what is good, and what is good must always be a good. For example, wealth would be an indifferent, because there are conceivable situations in which it is not good (using it to buy cocaine). Obviously, there is a distinction between a thing being Ð''good' and having Ð''value.' While technically, in strict adherence to Stoic claims, we must say that we are indifferent to wealth and even our health, there is no denying that almost always, they are beneficial. These indifferents are to be accepted, and others, such as disease, are to be rejected. As we learn to differentiate and make wise choices, things will be reevaluated and things that were once good, like wealth, will be seen instead as merely Ð''preferred.' A part of Stoic virtue is the ability to wisely choose between indifferents. For a person to be as indifferent to the illness of a relative as to the destruction of a jug is unlikely in any circumstance. The difference comes from the intention. For the Stoic, the intention is to do the right thing. Striving to preserve the life and health of a loved one is just and good; and if in striving correctly, the desired outcome is still not reached through the vicissitudes of fate, then there is no blame to be assigned and no reason for guilt or grief, having done all that is in ones power.

The second common objection is connected, and is that the elimination of emotions seems ruthless and out of sync with modern psychiatry. The concept of apatheia is misleadingly named; the Stoic view is not incompatible with the wise and virtuous person still having some feelings. The wise person experiences not delight but joy (at living a wise life); not fear but caution (which prevents them from accepting with false impressions); not lust for preferred