The Bali Bombing

Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Bali Bombing

October 12, 2002 would become a decisive turning point for foreign and domestic politics in Indonesia. On that day, the lives of over two hundred and two people were claimed after three bombs were denoted simultaneously in Bali and one in Sulawesi. This act of violence was to become the most devastating act of terrorism on Indonesian soil. The Bali bombing can be viewed as the most devastating act of terrorism not only because the bombing was the first attack against the country, but also because the attack itself can be viewed within the typical framework of the ~{!.~}revolt against the West~{!/~} as Bellamy (2005) has argued.

The argument put forth above is not meant to downplay the effects of Islamic Radicalism within Southeast Asia. Islamic Radicalism is not, as Desker suggests in Contemporary Southeast Asia Journal, a ~{!0~}sudden~{!1~} or ~{!0~}recent~{!1~} phenomenon (Desker, 489). Indonesia is, of course, the world~{!/~}s largest Muslim country and has been ravaged by conflicts since the fall of the authoritarian New Order in May 1998 (Best.et.al., 437). However, although there is certainly a broader and longer-term historical context in which to properly assess terrorism within the region (Bellamy, 237), the Bali bombing also reminds society that the exercise of violence, most notably by non-state actors, can drastically destabilize relations within the country and outside of it. The Bali bombing itself was just a means to unfold other venues of terrorism -such as fear and other psychological effects, questionable policies enacted by the state, and other negative consequences - within Indonesia.

There is a plethora of evidence to suggest that the Bali bombing can indeed be viewed within the framework of a revolt against the West. Indeed, although the Indonesian government was initially reluctant to assist the United States in its campaign against terrorism -- which is clearly evidenced in the fact that the Indonesian government froze the assets of terrorist suspects only when the U.S. threatened economic, sanctions (Cotton, 143) -- there was pressure eventually, and with good reason. Intelligence agencies had established that there was evidence of Al Qaeda training camps in Sulawesi. However, in addition, there was evidence that funding was coming through for the fundamentalist organization known as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a group that is committed to the creation of a pan-Islamic state within the archipelago (Cotton, 141). As continual pressure to act came from all sides -- namely, the United States and Australia -- it was time for the Indonesia government to act against the growing threat of terrorism within the country and they were forced to choose a side. They sided with the West.

No more of action illustrates the Indonesian government~{!/~}s position than Megawati Sukarnoputri~{!/~}s discussions with Australian Prime Minister John Howard, which resulted in memorandum of understanding on terrorism (Cotton, 142). Cotton claims that this memorandum ~{!0~}related specifically to intelligence sharing and cooperative efforts on international manifestations of terrorism~{!1~}, but to outsiders, the memorandum and the meeting represented far more than merely a mutual understanding of terrorism. To organizations such as Al Qaeda, the meeting and the resulting agreement between the two countries was an alliance of sorts; specifically of ~{!0~}us~{!1~} (e.g. the West) versus ~{!0~}them~{!1~} (e.g. the Islamic Radicalisms). Howard himself noted what kind of message the meeting sent when he noted, ~{!0~}That [ the memorandum of understanding] will send a very strong signal that Indonesia and Australia are serious about this challenge~{!1~} [of terrorism] (~{!0~}Jakarta, Canberra to Forge Terror Pact~{!1~}, p. 1).

The above, then, suggests that while the historical development of Islamic Radicalism within Southeast Asia is important to understanding the Bali bombing, what can truly be gleaned from analyzing the event is that the terrorist attack resulted from a perceived (or real) alliance between the two nations. The coalition that formed was an obvious threat to the terrorist network and the result is evident in the collective destruction that occurred on 2002. Most unfortunately, the Bali bombing can clearly be viewed within the framework of ~{!.~}revolt against the West~{!/~} as Bellamy (2005) has suggested.

The Bali bombing can also be viewed as one of the most devastating attacks on Indonesian soil because of what it has unfolded. As was mentioned previously, this singular act of terrorism incurs fear within society and, by extension, within the government. The violence alone is enough to change the normative activity, whether such activity is related to economics, politics, or even the decisions that civilians make. Lutz and Lutz (2004) explain that, for example, foreign economic activity is likely to substantially decrease after an attack simply because people are fearful to visit the region. Such a consequence is clearly evidenced in Indonesia where revenues substantially decreased in heavily traveled tourist areas, which is, of course, where the terrorists targeted in their bombings (Lutz and Lutz, 36).

On the other hand, one often ignored but important consequence is that acts of violence as perpetuated by members of Al Qaeda are that it has unleashed a new type of terrorism. As described by Simon and Benjamin, the attacks against the World Trade Center and Bali were ~{!0~}harbingers of a new and vastly more threatening terrorism~{!1~} (cited in Bellamy, 239) intended to produce mass casualties.

It is useful to take a closer look at what this so-called ~{!.~}new terrorism~{!/~}