Truman Decision

Truman Decision

President Harry S. Truman decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan is perhaps the most controversial act of policy in United States history. One of the many different reasons given for the use of this weapon was the shock effect it would produce in the Japanese foreign policy circle. While the shock of the Japanese will be discussed later, it is important to note that it had a similar effect on the west. This shock effect has caused countless authors to speculate as to the motivation behind, and effects of this revolutionary weapon.

For a time, the euphoria that came along with such a tremendous victory, as well as the national solidarity generated by America involvement in the cold war made this decision immune to speculation. Participation in the Vietnam conflict, and the division it caused in the 1970 produced an atmosphere in which the government was scrutinized. Unpopular military techniques employed in that war led some to question the techniques of wars gone past. Of course the glaring technique was the use of atomic weaponry.

Some authors, outraged at the determination to use atomic weaponry, have speculated that Truman decision was based upon diplomatic problems concerning the Soviet Union. These critics have argued that Truman used atomic weaponry in order to make the Soviet Union more likely to adhere to an American viewpoint of the post-war world. They also contend that the atomic bomb was used because of its ability to bring about the end of the war before the Soviet Union had a chance to occupy Manchuria. The most critical of these scholars have gone as far as to say that the decision to use the bomb in order to intimidate the Soviet Union was the first step towards the Cold War.

These evisionist historians argue that there were many indicators that the use of atomic weaponry was not necessary to end the conflict with Japan. They believe that, had the United States altered its ruthless approach to Japanese surrender, they would have capitulated. At times, they go as far as to say that Japan was ready to surrender even if the surrender terms had not been altered. Revisionist historians also contend that only a hock was needed to bring about Japans capitulation. This could have been in the form of a Soviet Declaration of war or even the exhibition of an atomic bomb.

The evidence used by revisionist historians includes government documents, intercepted Japanese cables, and private memoirs of foreign policy officials. These documents are abundant and, at times extremely convincing. In fact, many military reports as well as intercepted Japanese cables described a weak Japan, unwilling to continue the war effort. In addition to this, many policy makers influential at this time, including Truman himself have published memoirs that would lead one to believe that Soviet considerations did play a key role in the decision to use the bomb.

The revisionist interpretation of the last days of Imperial Japan has recently been challenged. Those challenging these ideas generally belong to what some would label eo-classical circles. The fundamental premise of these historians is that Truman used the bomb to end World War II with minimal loss of life. They reject ideas concerning Japan willingness to surrender. They argue that, without the bomb, Allied forces would have been forced to invade mainland Japan. This, of course, would have meant the loss of an untold number of lives.

The evidence used by neo-classical historians includes government documents, intercepted Japanese cables, and published memoirs of foreign policy makers. If this sounds familiar, it should. These scholars base their claims on exactly the same type of evidence as their adversaries. The interesting thing about this is that their use of the evidence is as convincing as the revisionists. This may simply be due to the ambiguity of the documents, or the sheer volume they represent. In fact, there is a deeper meaning. The reason both cases can be built so well upon the same evidence is that they both have some element of truth..

To examine the case of the revisionist historians, the writings of Gar Alperovitz and Barton Bernstein will be used. Atomic Diplomacy, Alperovitz groundbreaking revisionist work will show the correlation between the atomic bomb and Truman's policy toward the Soviet Union. Along the way to showing this correlation, Alperovitz examines the reasoning behind the decision to actually use the atomic bomb against Japan. He also approaches a discussion of the responsibility the United States should claim for the Cold War. It is important to note that only on rare occasions does Alperovitz attempt to downplay American casualty estimates, a major crux of the neoclassical argument.

Publications by Barton Bernstein will argue that the atomic bomb was responsible for the Cold War. He also sets out to expose the less noble reasons Truman had for using the bomb against Japan. In the process of building this point, he too will discuss the diplomatic considerations behind the decision to use the bomb. While operating in a slightly more idea based model, Bernstein opts for encompassing, thoughtful conclusions than hard, tangible facts. Bernstein also avoids directly refuting the idea that the bomb saved American and Japanese lives.

The neoclassical case will be explored using the works of Paul Walker and Robert Newman. Having the advantage of being the later of two arguments, the neoclassicals can attempt to refute the conclusions of the revisionists. Their criticism, however, is limited to the debate over the willingness of Japan to surrender. The fact that the bomb had diplomatic implications regarding the Soviet Union is not largely debated by Walker only mildly rejected by Newman.

In his work, military historian Paul Walker examines recently declassified government documents regarding the projected number of losses expected in an invasion of Japan. He uses these numbers, as well as scenarios from other battles with Japanese forces to argue that the Atomic bomb was necessary to end the war in the pacific. Walker also addresses the usual arguments for and against the bomb, but does so only after establishing the necessity of the use of the bomb from a strictly statistical perspective.

Robert Newman main thesis is simply that Truman decision to use the bomb was nothing more than a sensible military decision. This thesis has three main points. The first of these is the fact that the report that many revisionists base their conclusions upon, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, was inaccurate. Next, he argues against the claim that America policy of nconditional Surrender did not prolong the war in the Pacific. Lastly, Newman argues that the use of the atomic bomb was