Was Russia a Constitutional Monarchy?

Tsar Nicholas II was the last Russian Emperor; his abdication in March 1917 ended the centuries old Romanov dynasty. Throughout his reign, he embarked on a repressive campaign to uphold his divine right to the throne, however, he was faced with much opposition as the spread of revolutionary thought led to cries for parliamentary change. To some extent Russia can be seen to be a constitutional monarchy as there was reform in 1905 – The October Manifesto – with set principles that defined how the state was to be governed. However, there is enough evidence in reforms and repression that argue that although a constitution was in place, the state remained thoroughly autocratic up until the February revolution, thus meaning that Russia was not ‘truly’ constitutional.

One way in which Russia could be considered a truly constitutional monarchy is due to the progressive reforming of the political structure. The October manifesto was a departure from the regime's traditional despotic nature, as seen prior to its enactment; as Russia was an extremely repressive state. The Byzantine nature under which Alexander III ruled, influenced, exemplifies the backwardness of Russian political nature in the nineteenth century as his 'divine' and 'unshakable' right to rule was supported by the orthodox church, the elites and the Okhrana. The new constitution intended to grant many civil liberties such as freedom of speech, press, habeas corpus, as well as the establishment of a state Duma elected on universal male suffrage, all of which had not been previously experienced. Therefore, the October Manifesto is the first sign of a Western liberalised constitution in Imperial Russia. This is shown in the allowance of assembly and debates on policy and opposition, resulting in the formation of political parties. Timasheff uses the constitution in his article to oppose the orthodox view that the overthrowing of the Tsar was due to a stagnation in the political and social development of Russia, as he describes the Duma as a clear political step forwards that forced the autocracy to abdicate some leverage because 'no law could longer be enact without the approval of the body', also arguing that political change coincided with the development of Russian culture and economy. This view coincides with other revisionist thinkers, such as Ferenczi who provides an even more optimistic tone when discussing the system of laws, stating that it altered Russia's style of government and political culture, not only her political institutions. Both of these arguments fit within the brackets of the modernisation theory as they discuss the relative improvements in government during the transitional phase between an imperial and feudal state to, eventually, a liberal capitalist one. Moreover, the success of the constitution in reforming the state can be seen in the success of the Dumas in passing some indispensable laws that initiated social progress - the 1908 and 1912 bills introduced universal primary education and insurance for industrial labourers respectively – demonstrating how they existed and worked within the limits of the constitution. Overall, the October Manifesto can be interpreted to show the deviation from the dictorial norm that was experienced in the years prior to its enactment, which created a constitutional monarchy in which the Tsar, the Duma and indeed the entire populace of Russia were bounded by.

On the other hand, it can be argued that the October Manifesto did not create a truly constitutional monarchy and was only implemented to uphold and enhance the pillars of autocracy. The Manifesto opposed everything that the Tsar upheld as he believed in his divine right to rule by decree without limited power and the succession of the throne down the Romanov line. Nicholas himself described the publication of the constitution as the 'greatest sin of his life', demonstrating his greatest distaste for a liberalised Russia and giving evidence to the theory that he would do anything to undermine everything the constitution embodied. While previously stated historians argue in favour of the manifesto, Figes opposes completely the view that it was progressive. Instead he proposes the idea that the manifesto was a tactical manoeuvre as a reaction to the failed revolution of 1905 that challenged the Tsar's kingship. This socio-political analysis details how the aim of its implementation was clearly to 'isolate the left by pacifying the liberals', placing limits on the bureaucracy and not Nicholas' own autocratic prerogatives. This means that the Tsar was able to stay all supreme as the fact that he was still head of state satisfied monarchists and the conservative elites, and by introducing a quasi-constitution led to divisions in those who advocated for political reform and democracy. An example of this division is between the Octobrists and the Kadets; while the Octobrists were satisfied with the new constitution, the Kadets took a more radical approach and did not view this measure as an end to the reorganisation of state. Furthermore, the constitution can be seen to further encourage autocracy in how the it organised institutions. Although it introduced the State Duma, the manifesto also inhabited the State Council, which was the higher chamber that held more authority. This chamber wasn’t democratic because the Tsar personally appointed the ministers, which allowed him to fill his government with conservatives and his strongest supporters, as opposed to the universal suffrage experienced in the Duma. The imbalance of power led to the successive failures of the first two Dumas. For instance, the first Duma lasted only two months as it passed a vote of no confidence in Goremykin's government, which backfired, resulting in dissolution. The new laws therefore arguably achieved little progress as although a new body was created, the bills they introduced in a liberal light were blocked either by the State Council or completely vetoed by the Tsar. On that account, the October Manifesto is ambiguous in the sense that while it essentially created a constitutional monarchy it cannot be defined as 'true' as it was arguably implemented to preserve the autocratic nature of the state.

Following from this, the Fundamental Laws introduced in 1906 can be seen to be a part of the new constitution that only works to strengthen the Tsars autocratic position. This edict was issued by the Tsar on the eve of the formation of the first Duma, as an immediate way to demonstrate to those elected that any power they hold is obsolete in his eye through its provocative timing. Its repressive undertone manages to leave the autocracy virtually unimpaired. The primary focus of these new laws was on the essence of the supreme autocratic power, including many articles on the position