World War One

World War One, the first worldwide destructive conflict manifested by Western civilization, has been a subject of countless analysis and interpretations dedicated to the cause of the conflict. Initially the blame was laid on Germany and its allies. Over time historians have adapted broader guilt perspectives which include various interacting factors. Using three historians: Fritz Fischer, Gehrard Ritter and Konrad Jarausch, the transition from total German guilt to a broader blame scenario can be analyzed.

The German historian, Fritz Fischer provides what many consider the most skeptical analysis of the causes of World War One. Through examples that include: German actions in the Moroccan crisis and the attempts to secure an alliance with Britain, Fischer stated that Germany wanted a war and had been planning for war since the early twentieth century. He states that in causing a war Germany had hoped to become a world power. Fischer puts emphases on Germany's "blank cheque" to Austria. "Ð'...could Ð''count on Germany's full support' even in the case of Ð''grave European complications'; Germany, Ð''loyal as ever to her ally', would stand by Austria even should the Serbian conflict lead to war between Austria and Russia." (Fischer p.53) Fischer believes this "blank cheque" was strategically given in order to give the Austrians the confidence needed to attack the Serbians after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand. Fisher's statement also shows that Germany was prepared for war and knew that giving Austria such confidence would lead to a conflict. Fischer also states that by using the assassination as an opportunity to begin a war, Germany was able to push Austria into declaring war on Serbia. Many believe that Germany deliberately pushed Austria, who at the time did not really take much action after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, towards an aggressive stance for their own benefit. This would eliminate Germany from appearing as the instigators but rather an ally who supported a friend. Fischer also explains that the alliance with Britain was so sought after because it would help prevent a dual attack from Russia and France.

Germany began to surpass Britain in naval power and this angered the British. The second Moroccan crisis in which the German gunboat "Panther" arrived at the Moroccan port of Agadir caused further Anglo-German tension. The crisis ended badly for Germany and caused them to have some resentment towards Britain. Now that Britain saw Germany as an aggressor they began to have a close relationship with France. This led Germany to create the Scliefflen plan in order to protect itself from dual attack. Now that alliances were clearly defined, German ministers advised Austria to send an ultimatum which would "avoid the odium of attacking Serbia without warning, put her in the wrong, and thus make it easier for Rumania and Britain to preserve at least neutrality." (Fischer p.56) Fischer believes that the ultimatum was an attempt to allow attacks on Serbia without being labeled as an aggressor. This would hopefully stop neutral countries from getting involved and allow an easier war to be fought. The ultimatum was sent and Austria was gearing up for war. Britain began to intervene and wanted to hold a conference. Fischer states that Germany's actions during this process demonstrate they were no longer trying to avoid a continental war but rather maneuver Germany into the best position possible.

Fritz Fischer takes a radical stance with his arguments. Instead of using events and situations that occurred Fischer takes into account the thoughts of the German ministers and the strategic planning that was thought out prior to World War One. Fischer then concludes that the assassination in Bosnia was not the cause of the war, but rather a trigger that unleashed the final steps towards war. Fischer puts all the blame on Germany stating that, although they appeared reserved and peaceful, it was only a cover for their true nature. Fischer believes that Germany sought war in order to assert themselves as world powers and would use any method to accomplish it. Although one might be convinced by Fischer's arguments, they do contain some flaws. Fischer's main arguments have to do with German foreign policy; Fischer states that Germany sought an alliance with Britain in order to better itself in a war between Russia and France. This idea makes German foreign policy a lot more aggressive than it really was. Germany wanted an alliance with Britain for security reasons, they were surrounded by potential enemies, but did not assume that having Britain as an ally would allow them to start a war. Another problem with Fischer's arguments is his attitude toward Germany's alliance with Austria. When Germany gives the infamous "blank cheque" to Austria, Fischer believes that this was done in order to boost Austrian confidence and allow them to attack. This would cause a war that Germany did not personally begin, making them look less aggressive. This assumption of the alliance shows that Fischer believes Germany only used the alliance to make Austria do the Ð''dirty work'. Fischer does not state that Germany was only backing up its ally in order to be truthful to its alliance. Fischer's arguments are convincing at first glance, but a deeper interpretation shows that they are just a way to draw attention to the situation. Fischer manipulates words and actions taken by German ministers to make it look like a war is being considered. To counter Fischer's arguments Gerhard Ritter wrote a counter to Fischer's views in his "A New War-Guilt Thesis?"

Gerhard Ritter, another Germany historian counters Fischer's thesis because he does not believe Fischer is telling the whole truth. Ritter begins by explaining that Fischer's fist witness of the Berlin government was a journalist named Vikor Naumann. Naumann tried to persuade an attack on Serbia through Count Hoyos, saying even if it meant risking a European war, Serbia should be attacked. Ritter explains that Fischer portrays Austrian policy as "fundamentally peaceful oriented and only through the greatest pressure by Berlin did Austria allow herself to be pushed into war." (Ritter p.99)

Ritter argues that Germany was not pushing Austria into war but rather supporting them in any decision made. Ritter explains that the German push for quick action