Legal Memoradum

ARGUMENT

I. THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER THE ALABAMA "SUDDEN EMERGENCY DOCTRINE".

Defendant, Tiffany Alexis, is entitled to relief from liability arising from the accident with Mr. Gibson under the Alabama "Sudden Emergency Doctrine." The sudden emergency doctrine states that "one who, without fault on his part, is suddenly and unexpectedly placed in perilous situation, so as to be compelled to act instantly and without opportunity for exercise of deliberate judgment, is not chargeable with negligence if, in attempting to escape from peril or to minimize threatened injury, he acts as a person of reasonable prudence would or might have acted in same or similar situation has no application to, and cannot be invoked by, one who wrongfully and voluntarily puts himself in such position of danger." Swindall v. Speigner, 214 So.2d 436 Ala.,(1968).

A. Miss Alexis was not at fault and did not cause the emergency.

"One who has by own conduct brought about sudden peril may not invoke the sudden emergency doctrine as a defense." Mitchell v. Johnson, 641 So.2d 238 Ala.,1994 Although Ms. Alexis was pulled over to the side of the road due to a diabetic spell, she did not bring about the sudden peril. She pulled over and got out of the lane of traffic the moment she began to feel ill. This is not evidence of someone who is the cause of an emergency but rather of someone who saw the possibility of danger and acted in such a way to avoid it.

In Mitchell v. Johnson, 641 So. 2d. 238, the sudden emergency doctrine did not apply because the driver testified that she had neither slowed down nor applied her brakes and was traveling at speed that would not have allowed her time to stop, so her conduct caused the sudden peril. If Miss Alexis would have stopped her car in the middle of the road, then she would have been the cause of the sudden emergency. Since she pulled out of the road and did not cause the emergency, the sudden emergency doctrine is available to her. Miss Alexis was not the proximate cause of the emergency and should be granted relief under the sudden emergency doctrine.

B. Miss Alexis did not have the opportunity for deliberate judgment.

Sudden emergency doctrine generally states that if a motorist is faced with an emergency situation through no fault of his own, he is not to be held to same correctness of judgment and action as if he had had the time and opportunity necessary to fully consider the situation. Polansky v. Dixon, 587 So.2d 401 Ala.Civ.App.,(1991) Miss Alexis did not have the opportunity for deliberate judgment. The sudden emergency came about so quickly that it was impossible for her to have had the opportunity to act in a rational state of mind. Nevertheless, she did pull her vehicle off the road and out of the way of traffic. Even though she was experiencing blurry vision and was frightened, she managed to get to a safe place on the shoulder of the road. Under these circumstances, her actions are more than enough to warrant that she acted in the best way possible. She did not, however, have time to act in the most appropriate manner; therefore relief should be granted under the sudden emergency doctrine.

C. Miss Alexis acted with prudence and is not chargeable with negligence.

"Sudden emergency doctrine cannot properly be considered as a defense to allegations of negligence; instead, it provides a qualified standard of care by which, in appropriate circumstances, a party's conduct can be measured." Burns v. Martin, 589 So. 2d. 147 Ala (1991). Miss Alexis acted in a prudent manner under the given circumstances. Her conduct was neither wanton nor reckless. The doctrine of sudden emergency should not be considered as a defense here but should accurately measure Alexis's conduct in the situation. "The application of the sudden emergency doctrine does not relieve the defendant of his duty to act as a reasonable person, under the same or similar circumstances, would act. Instead, it is a recognition of the difficulties inherent in making accurate judgments during emergencies." Prosser and Keaton Ð'§ 33 at 197. Miss Alexis should not be relieved of her duty to act in a reasonable manner, but the court should recognize the fact that she was placed in a situation in which a well-thought and conscious decision would almost be impossible to make. Although she was placed in an emergency situation, she still acted in a reasonable manner by immediately pulling her car off the road. There is nothing in her course of action that is negligent or wanton as alleged by the complaint of Mr. Gibson. Alabama courts have adopted the definition of wantonness conduct as "a conscious doing of some act or omission of some duty under knowledge of existing conditions and conscious that from the doing of such act or omission of such duty injury will likely or probably result. Before a party could be said to be guilty of wanton conduct it must be shown that with reckless indifference to the consequences he consciously and intentionally did some wrongful act or omitted some known duty which produced the injury." Duke v. Gaines, 224 Ala. 519 (1932) Her conduct, when measured under the sudden emergency doctrine, was not wanton but rather quite appropriate. Therefore, she should be granted relief under the circumstances.

II. DEFENDANT IS NOT NEGLIGENT AND IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE

ACCIDENT UNDER THE ALABAMA LAW OF DAMAGES Ð'§ 30:4

There is no liability on the part of an operator of a motor vehicle who, while driving, is suddenly and unexpectedly stricken by some illness or blackout that renders the operator unconscious or incapable of controlling the vehicle, the lack of control of which is the proximate cause of an injury to another, where the driver had no cause to anticipate the illness or blackout at the time and place of