Smokin Joe

There are at least two models of what it is to be a feminist ethicist or moral philosopher. One model requires that one accept a distinctively feminist ethical theory. I will argue against this model by arguing that since the concept of a feminist ethical theory is highly unclear, any claim that ethicists who are feminist need one is also unclear and inadequately defended. I will advocate what I call a Ð''minimal model' of feminist ethics, arguing that it is philosophically and practically sufficient to meet feminist goals.

1. Ð''Minimal' and Ð''Extended' Models of Feminist Ethics

On the Ð''minimal model', to be a feminist ethicist one must meet only two conditions. First, one must have certain substantive moral beliefs regarding the treatment of and attitudes toward women and girls; second, one must believe that any moral theory that implies that these beliefs are false is ipso facto defective.[1]

According to this model, some moral beliefs that one must hold to be a feminist ethicist include the beliefs that at least some[2] Ð''women are [and have been] victims of wrongdoing,' that some have been (and still are) Ð''oppressed,' and that Ð''much of society's treatment of women is wrong' (Brennan, p. 860; Jaggar 1991, p. 95). Many other seemingly correct moral judgments like these could easily be voiced at all levels of particularity and generality.

Whether these beliefs are arrived at by intuitively Ð''seeing' their truth or by way of extended reasoning and argument does not seem to matter for this model: it is neutral between foundationalist or intuitionist and coherentist or reflective equilibrium-based moral epistemologists, and even externalist theories of justification as well. However, what does matter is that the core of these beliefs are thought to be exceedingly well justified and reasonable, so much so that any abstract theorizing that implies that these beliefs are false is subject to, at least, serious doubt and scrutiny, or, more likely, immediate rejection.

Also worthy of rejection are theories that support the judgments that moral claims like these are generally true but give obviously faulty reasons for why this is so. Here we might also imagine a possible view about the treatment of women that is analogous to Kant's treatment of animals: men shouldn't harm women because when they do so they invariably wind up harming other men. Surely, even if it were true that men who harm women also (even necessarily) eventually harm men, this doesn't approach anything like the best reasons why men shouldn't harm women. To use a fitting sports metaphor, interactions with women are not a Ð''warm up' for the moral Ð''ball game' that is played only by men. This view misses the obvious truth that women's interests matter in their own right, just as Kant missed the fact that beings who have interests but are not autonomous, rational agents (such as many non-human animals and babies, mentally challenged and senile humans) deserve to have their interests directly taken into account.

While this Kant-inspired view is obviously flawed (both for women and, in its intended version, for animals), philosopher who accept the Ð''minimal model of feminist ethics' might still accept other traditional ethical theories, such as other Kantian-like Ð''golden rule' or respect-based rights theories, various deontologies and pluralistic consequentialisms, or virtue ethics (or, perhaps, some consistent combination of these views).[3] For feminists who seek insight into the basic nature of right and wrong, a traditional ethical theory is an option.

Some ethicists who are feminists take this option. Allison Jaggar reports that, Ð''Not all feminists are convinced that western ethical theory is deeply flawed . . ; on the contrary, some propose that one or another existing theory - perhaps with a little fine tuning - is entirely adequate to address feminist ethical concerns' (2000b, 348). She characterizes this position as Ð''a matter of adding women and stirring them into existing theory,' and thereby Ð''us[ing] the philosophical resources of [the] times to challenge at least some aspects of women's subordination to men' (1991, p. 82; 2000a, p. 455). Margaret Walker also reports that, Ð''Some philosophers remain convinced that well-established traditions of moral thought and their allied epistemologies, in particular those of Kant and Aristotle, can be effectively recruited to feminist criticism' (1998a, p. 368).[4]

An ethicist who accepts what I have called the Ð''minimal model' of feminist ethics is someone like Walker and Jaggar describe. He or she remains convinced that some Ð''traditional' ethical theory is Ð''good enough' to do the job needed to meet feminist practical and philosophical goals. She thinks something like a traditional ethical theory is roughly true and that it provides an adequate, if not the best, explanation for why her substantive moral beliefs about women are true. And she hasn't been convinced that the general structure of some traditional ethical theory or theory for how we ought to reason about moral theory and problems needs to be replaced. She also thinks that she has not been presented with a clear and adequately defended alternative to a traditional theory either.

Who might articulate and defend an alternative to this Ð''minimal' model, which accepts traditional ethical theory? Someone who accepts what I will call an Ð''extended' model of feminist ethics. This model requires that, to be a genuine feminist ethicist, in addition to meeting the two constraints of the first model (i.e., holding Ð''positive' moral judgments regarding women and thinking they are well justified) one must also accept a distinctly feminist ethical theory.

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